Emerging disinformation trends: Differences and specific vulnerabilities across Hungary, Bulgaria, Cyprus and Malta during elections

A comparative analysis of general elections across Bulgaria, Cyprus, Hungary, and Malta reveals a sophisticated evolution in electoral information manipulation.

Disinformation tactics have largely shifted from isolated falsehoods to highly coordinated, multi-layered campaigns combining AI-generated propaganda, opaque political advertising, algorithmic amplification, and foreign and domestic influence networks.

Across all four battlegrounds, manipulation strategies relied on systematic narrative control rather than sporadic online hoaxes. 

• Hungary saw the most systemic manipulation ecosystem, with coordinated domestic networks tied to Orban’s party, Fidez, AI-assisted propaganda and at least two distinct Russian-linked operations converging into a dense campaign.
• Bulgaria’s ecosystem centred on a persistent, state-adjacent pro-Kremlin amplification infrastructure aimed at eroding institutional trust and deepening existing domestic polarisation, rather than boosting one specific party.
• Cyprus and Malta faced more fragmented, issue-specific manipulation exploiting gaps in platform governance, with a weaker domestic disinformation ecosystem but real vulnerabilities in anonymous advertising, ad-transparency mislabelling and an emerging layer of Chinese state-sponsored propaganda.

In Bulgaria, automated coordination appeared as a central feature: For example, BROD detected nearly 49,000 Telegram posts across 42 coordinated channels, and posting volume up 75% from February to March. Researchers identified pro-Kremlin disinformation actors – notably a reactivated Pravda ecosystem – as the principal source of coordinated influence. Bulgaria’s pattern was dominated by foreign information manipulation exploiting domesitic political instability and societal polarisation.

The country stood apart as AI played only a minor direct role in shaping campaign narratives (except a significant case of AI-generated content used in a gender-based smear campaign against a woman journalist).

Major social media platforms remain critical vulnerabilities during national votes, constrained by inadequate political advertising transparency, restricted researcher data access, and predominantly reactive content moderation. All four cases show platform architecture, not just individual posts, becoming a manipulation vector.

Read the full report included in the fourth edition of the new monthly EDMO Signals & Noise newsletter to explore the complete findings, analytical framework, and country-specific case studies.

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Learn more about the information environment specifics and the disinformation narratives during the 2026 parliamentary elections in Bulgarian here

Learn more about the elections in EU Member States and overseas countries and territories here