Position Document regarding the National Defense Strategy of the Country 2025-2030

Position Document regarding the National Defense Strategy of the Country 2025-2030 

Center for Independent Journalism (CJI) and Funky Citizens
November 14, 2025 

Cover letter 

To: The Department of National Security 
Of the Presidential Administration

The President of Romania, Mr. Nicușor Dan, presented on Wednesday, November 12, the National Defense Strategy of the Country for the period 2025-2030: "Independence and Solidarity: Romania's Vision for a Changing World". The document is now in public consultation, to be endorsed in CSAT on November 24 and presented in Parliament on November 26.

Funky Citizens and the Center for Independent Journalism (CJI), organizations that are part of the Bulgarian-Romanian Digital Media Observatory, part of EDMO (European Digital Media Observatory), welcome this initiative and appreciate the inclusion of hybrid threats and media education in the strategic document. Therefore, we have chosen to position ourselves on topics in which both organizations have vast and complementary experience: combating disinformation and hybrid threats, as well as media education. We transmit this contribution starting from a common conviction: the greatest threat to Romania's security does not come only from the outside, but from our internal weaknesses. Corruption, deficient public institutions, citizens' lack of trust in the state, the absence of real civic participation mechanisms, the lack of media education and citizens' incapacity to critically evaluate information: these are the vulnerabilities that hybrid threats exploit and that erode the country's democratic resilience.

About the Center for Independent Journalism and Funky Citizens 

CJI has been active since 1994 in developing quality journalism and media education in Romania. Our experience includes: training programs in media education for teachers and students, research and advocacy for integrating media education into the curriculum, supporting local and independent journalism, monitoring public policies in the field of media and media education, and collaboration with educational institutions, NGOs, and international experts for developing media education standards.

Funky Citizens is part of EDMO (European Digital Media Observatory) - a European network for monitoring disinformation, of the International Fact-checking Network and EFCSN (European Fact-Checking Standards Network). We contributed to the application of the Digital Services Act during the elections in Romania and facilitated a similar dialogue for the elections in the Republic of Moldova. We are one of the first civic organizations in Romania that signaled the spread of Russian narratives as early as 2022 and have systematically documented how propaganda exploits the informational needs of Romanians. Our experience includes: continuous monitoring of the Romanian informational space, analysis of disinformation and manipulation patterns, collaboration with digital platforms for DSA implementation, fact-checking and advocacy for institutional transparency and responsible regulation of digital platforms.

Both organizations have actively contributed to European debates about combating disinformation, respecting democratic principles and freedom of expression. Also, the two organizations implement programs that support media and digital literacy together, especially among young people. Our complementary expertise allows us to offer an integrated perspective on the strategic response that Romania must develop.

Recommendations

A. Media education - integration into national strategies and school curriculum

1. Media education - national interest urgency

• The fight against disinformation requires a whole-of-society approach, not just a focus on individuals and content. Media education is not just a matter of "online safety" or protection of minors, but builds a basic intellectual infrastructure: citizens' capacity to evaluate sources, to recognize manipulation, to understand how the media ecosystem and digital platforms work.
• Media education must be supported by coherent laws and institutional processes that guarantee access to information and an informational environment that promotes correct and balanced content, including through supporting quality journalism.
• Media education must be assumed and internalized by the university system, through the inclusion of media education in the initial training of teachers and journalists.
• Romania does not have a national strategy for media education, and the term is missing from key documents (NRRP, digitalization strategies, government programs). We welcome the Presidency's initiative to include it in the National Defense Strategy.
• Current policies focus almost exclusively on basic digital skills and equipment purchases, not on critical thinking, source analysis, and combating disinformation.
• The problem of disinformation in electoral context is already recognized at European level: the European Commission's Expert Group for media education explicitly discussed Romania's case in February 2025.
• In the absence of a coordinated state intervention, media education remains almost exclusively the responsibility of NGOs, with limited resources and fragmented impact.

2. Lessons from other states' experience

• Finland and Sweden have integrated media education into the curriculum at all levels of schooling (from early education to adults), with emphasis on critical skills and dedicated resources for teachers and students.
• Belgium (Wallonia-Brussels Region) created the Conseil supérieur de l'éducation aux médias (CSEM), with an annual budget (~1.2 million EUR + additional funds) and a permanent team, which coordinates teacher training and awareness campaigns.
• Brazil approved the National Media Education Strategy, which requests updating the national curriculum (BNCC) and introduces teacher training in media education, based on a broad public consultation process.

The common element: media education is treated as state policy, with explicit objectives in strategy, curricular integration, and multi-actor coordination mechanisms (government, civil society, universities, mass media).

3. Romania's shortcomings today

• The lack of a National Strategy for Media Education, with objectives, a calendar, and a budget.
• The absence of explicit references to media education in the NRRP and other relevant strategies.
• The state de facto delegates media education to NGOs, without a national institutional architecture, without curricular standards, and without impact monitoring.
• Without a strategic intervention, adequately financed and with adequate human resources, Romania remains vulnerable to disinformation, polarization, and manipulation campaigns, with direct effects on the quality of democracy and trust in institutions.

4. Concrete proposals – with emphasis on inclusion in curriculum

• Central point: the integration of media education into the national curriculum
• Revisioning framework plans and school programs for all levels, to introduce media education competencies as part of learning outcomes, not just as "optional" activities.
• Clearly defining competencies: critical analysis of sources, information verification, identification of manipulation and propaganda techniques, understanding digital platforms and algorithms, ethics in online communication.
• Training of teaching staff
  • Transforming "digital pedagogy" type calls into programs that mandatorily include consistent media education modules, not just technology use.
  • Creating a national network of trainers in media education (in partnership with universities, teacher training institutions, and NGOs with expertise).
•  Institutional infrastructure – a national “hub” for media education
  • Establishing a central entity (national hub) for media education, following the model of #PortugalMediaLab or CSEM, with a dedicated budget and a permanent team.
  • The hub would coordinate the implementation of the National Strategy for Media Education, would centralize data, would support teacher networks, and would prepare annual reports on the state of media education in Romania.
• Public campaigns and access to quality content
• Launching national media education campaigns, inspired by the Portuguese model (PACS), with the involvement of public television, public radio, and digital platforms.
• Coherent public policies that support quality journalism and priority investment in local journalism
• Coherent investment in public radio-broadcasting service, so that it offers balanced information in the public space and positions itself as an actor that protects citizens' right to access information, without bias (following the BBC model).
• Creating equitable, transparent national funding lines with appropriate financial allocation for public and private media institutions.
• Public policies that determine the transparency of the identity of owners of influential pages or paid content, allowing users to evaluate their credibility and responsibility.
• Adapting the European legislation on online safety and the AI Act at the country level, in a proportional form, through which necessary transparency measures are adopted, while respecting the framework of freedom of expression.

The President’s role – political gestures with immediate impact

• Making an official request, addressed to the Government and Ministry of Education, to develop by a clear deadline (for example, 12 months) a National Strategy for Media Education, with emphasis on inclusion in curriculum.
• Creating, under the aegis of the Presidential Administration, a multi-actor working group (experts, NGOs, teachers, unions, CNA, universities) to prepare concrete recommendations for integrating media education into curriculum and teacher training.
• Introducing the media education subject in consultations with social partners and youth representatives, to politically and socially legitimize these changes.
• Transmitting a clear message that investments in media education are not a "curricular luxury", but a basic condition for Romania's democratic resilience in the face of disinformation and polarization.

B. Hybrid threats – robust research and coordinated response with democratic safeguards

1. Hybrid threats - national security urgency

• The Strategy correctly identifies the threat, but the response is vague. The chapter on hybrid threats (para. 23, 39, 44, 48) correctly recognizes that "the increasingly frequent and aggressive use of hybrid tools by revisionist actors such as the Russian Federation (...) aims to intimidate and weaken NATO and EU cohesion and to divide democratic societies" and that "human perception and will become targets of the most advanced form of manipulation, namely cognitive warfare". But the proposed response (para. 48, 97, 109) stops at the declarative level, without concrete mechanisms: How? With what institutions? Who does what?
• Hybrid threats require robust research of destabilization tactics, not just reactive fact-checking. Coordinated disinformation campaigns, synchronized cyber attacks, algorithmic manipulation, sophisticated micro-targeting work as an integrated system that exploits multiple vulnerabilities simultaneously. Romania needs the capacity to understand the substrates of disinformation (why certain narratives catch on, what needs they exploit), to analyze manipulation patterns (coordination, artificial amplification, timing, cross-border connections), to offer early warning, and to develop proactive response, not just reactive.
• The current response is institutionally fragmented and risks authoritarianism. SRI, SIE, CNA, ANCOM, the Ministry of Defense, MAE - each acts in silos, without real coordination, resulting in chaotic communication that erodes trust. Moreover, recent events (election annulment) have demonstrated the fundamental tension: institutions have power to intervene invoking "disinformation" and "foreign influence", but citizens cannot independently verify these claims. The result: deep polarization (50% support the intervention, 50% consider it a coup), both camps vulnerable to manipulation because lack of transparency creates space for conspiratorial interpretations.
• The state de facto delegates combating hybrid threats to NGOs and ad-hoc response, without national institutional architecture, without systematic research of adversaries' tactics, without integrated response capacity to complex malicious actions.
• Without a strategic intervention, with robust research, adequate institutional capacity, and verifiable transparency, Romania remains vulnerable to destabilization, with direct effects on national security and the quality of democracy.

Combating hybrid threats must be treated as a national security priority, with dedicated institutions, continuous research of adversaries' tactics, effective inter-institutional coordination, maximum transparency compatible with operational security, and collaboration with civil society for democratic safeguards.

2. Romania’s shortcomings today

• The lack of a dedicated institution for research and response to hybrid threats, with resources, specialized personnel, and clear mandate.
• Institutional fragmentation – each service/ministry acts in silos, without real coordination, without integrated analysis of patterns.
• The absence of systematic research capacity of destabilization tactics - we do not methodologically understand how hostile campaigns work, what vulnerabilities they exploit, how they evolve.
• The lack of institutional transparency – citizens cannot verify why and how institutions intervene, therefore creating polarization and eroding trust instead of building it.
• The absence of democratic safeguard mechanisms – there is no structure that ensures that the response to hybrid threats does not transform into narrative control or censorship.

3. Concrete proposals – with emphasis on robust research and verifiable transparency

Central point: The creation of an independent institution for research and response to hybrid threats

• Establishing a dedicated institution (following the model of Psychological Defense Agency or Center for Terrorism and Hybrid Threats), under the coordination of the presidential administration/CSAT, with adequate budget and specialized permanent team.
• The institution’s mandate:
  • Robust and continuous research of destabilization tactics (how campaigns work, what vulnerabilities they exploit, coordination patterns)
  • Integrated analysis of connected threats (disinformation + cyber + economic interference + political manipulation)
  • Early warning based on real-time monitoring
  • The development of scientific methodology for analyzing malicious actions, increasing credibility of reports
  • Effective inter-institutional coordination (elimination of silos)
  • The development of proactive, not just reactive response capacity

Coordination of inter-institutional response with democratic safeguards

• The creation of the Coordination Center for Hybrid Threats (CCAH) – inter-institutional mechanism that connects SRI, SIE, ANCOM, Ministry of Defense, MAE, CNA and other relevant institutions for: information sharing in real time, integrated analysis that connects patterns, coordinated response planning, unified strategic communication (not contradictory messages) and regular exercises for testing response capacity.
• What is esssential: including civil society representatives (with security clearance where necessary) who monitor that the response remains within democratic limits – proportional measures, civil liberties respected, maximum transparency compatible with operational security, citizens' voice represented.
• CCAH reports to CSAT, but also publicly, annually (with a separate classified annex), ensuring that the response is effective AND democratic.

Institutional transparency as the foundation of credibility

When institutions identify manipulation campaigns, they publish detailed reports (with redactions only for sensitive operational sources/methods):

• Who is behind the campaign (as much as can be established)
• What tactics do they use (fake accounts, artificial amplification, coordination)
• What narratives do they promote and what vulnerabilities do they exploit
• What technical evidence exists (patterns, metadata, cross-border connections)

• Reports allow for independent verification – journalists, researchers, civil society can request additional data, can validate or contest governmental analyses, platforms publish their own analyses.
• The decision-making process is documented transparently – who decided what action, on what legal basis, with what parliamentary/judicial oversight.
• The difference from narrative control is verifiability – we offer evidence that you can evaluate independently, we don't ask for blind trust. Transparency makes hostile campaigns costly (exposure compromises effectiveness), allows citizens to judge for themselves, builds trust through verifiability not through authority.

Civil society as an an essential independent actor

• Independent monitoring: Specialized NGOs (fact-checking, digital rights, media monitoring) receive access to data from platforms according to DSA, collaborate with EDMO at European level, report independently publicly (not through governmental clearing).
• Fact-checking and verification: Verifying public narratives, including those promoted by institutions; public alerting when institutions exceed democratic limits; representing citizens in debates about regulation
• Advocacy for democratic safeguards: Monitoring so that the response does not become censorship; defense of civil liberties; ensuring that measures are proportional.
• Fact-checking is necessary but insufficient if it is only reactive. It must be accompanied by: institutional transparency (to be able to verify what institutions say), investigative journalism (credible alternatives to official narratives), media education (citizens' capacity to evaluate themselves).

Educated citizens + transparent institutions = resilience to manipulation
Educated citizens + opaque institutions = fertile ground for conspiracy theories

The regulation of digital platforms

• Serious implementation of the Digital Services Act at national level:
  • Mandatory algorithmic transparency (what algorithms, what amplification criteria)
  • Public reporting on content moderation
  • Access to data for independent researchers
  • Users' right to contest decisions
• The National Authority for the DSA must be functional, with adequate resources and a clear mandate.
• European coordination – platforms are cross-border, fragmented regulation creates arbitrage. Romania actively participates in enforcement, exchanges information with member states, and does not act unilaterally.

Continuous and proactive monitoring of the informational space

• A permanent monitoring system that understands the substrates and evolution of disinformation in real time, not just in electoral periods.
• Disinformation is a permanent incubator – it systematically exploits citizens' frustrations. The response must be proactive:
  • Constant monitoring
  • Understanding how it profits from polarizing moments
  • Documenting and analysing patterns in real time
  • Capacity for anticipation and countering before amplification

Institutional capacity building - from declarations to action

• Substantial investment in capacity building:
  • Developing expertise in analyzing disinformation as a complex phenomenon
  • Understanding sophisticated strategies behind malicious actions
  • Transitioning from theory to practice - observing playbook in real deployment
  • Systematical documentation and rigorous discourse analysis
  • Strategic communication that is understandable to citizens
• We are facing accelerated erosion of trust in institutions. There is a need for restoration over time - with transparent, accessible, verifiable communication.

European cooperation and the exchange of experience

• Disinformation works cross-border – Romania CANNOT respond alone.
• Development of coordinated cross-border responses –  the case study of presidential elections in Romania 2024-2025 can be a starting point for strategies in other EU states.

This material was produced with the financial support of Fondation Botnar and co-funded by the European Union through the Bulgarian-Romanian Observatory of Digital Media project.

This material reflects only the views of the Centre for Independent Journalism and Funky Citizens, and the European Commission and Fondation Botnar cannot be held responsible for any use of the information contained herein.