Acknowledgements 

This report is the result of extensive collaboration between civil society organizations, investigative journalists, digital monitoring experts, and nearly one hundred volunteer observers who dedicated their time to document the electoral process in the Republic of Moldova.

We thank our Moldovan partners – mainly Transparency International Moldova, as well as the Center for Independent Journalism Moldova through the Mediacritica, the Independent Press Association project through the Stopfals.md project – for their constant cooperation, contributions to online monitoring, real-time information exchange, and the professionalism with which they documented hybrid threats often under difficult conditions. Their contributions were essential for understanding the local context and anticipating moments of peak narrative propagation in the information space. Thanks to Misreport for their consistent contribution to the briefing bulletins.

A special thanks goes to the organization Promo-LEX, whose extensive experience in election observation and periodic monitoring reports provided an indispensable context for evaluating the electoral process.

This activity was carried out within the framework of the Bulgarian-Romanian Media Observatory for Digital Media (BROD), a member of the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO), which facilitated access to escalation and coordination mechanisms at the European level for documenting problematic content on digital platforms.

We thank the 89 Funky Citizens observers who monitored 137 polling stations in Moldova and abroad, professionally and rigorously documenting all stages of the electoral process. Their dedication made the detailed analysis presented in this report possible.

Executive Summary

The parliamentary elections held on September 28, 2025, in the Republic of Moldova shows us a new stage in the transformation of democracy in the digital age. At the polling stations, things went surprisingly well–citizens were able to vote in optimal conditions, the systems worked, and classic fraud such as "stolen ballots" or "padded ballot boxes" was practically absent. This is good news and deserves recognition: the Republic of Moldova organizes logistically fair elections. But this technical achievement hides a deeper challenge. The fairness of election day no longer matters so much when the real battle for citizens' opinions was fought months earlier, in another place.

That "other place" is the digital space, where a manipulation campaign has been unfolding that makes everything we have seen before seem rudimentary. We are not talking about random fake posts or improvised bots. We are talking about Orthodox priests methodically trained in Moscow and paid to build religious propaganda networks on Telegram. We are talking about hundreds of fake accounts activated in a coordinated manner to simulate popular support. We are talking about entire cloned news sites that, once blocked, reappear under different domains within hours. We are talking about deepfakes that are becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish from reality. The problem is not just that these tactics exist–the problem deepens when social media platforms systematically amplify them, and the reaction often comes too late, when the goal of reaching millions of views has already been achieved. The Republic of Moldova has become a laboratory for testing the future of democratic elections: a future in which election day is fair, but the elections are already manipulated months in advance by social media algorithms.

However, what is noteworthy and constitutes the main set of good practices that Romanian authorities in particular must take into account is institutional communication both before and during the electoral process, with real-time updates on election day. Proactive communication and the reduction of the risks of fraud and electoral manipulation were the basis for building a framework of trust between the state and its citizens, given the constant justification of the measures taken by the authorities to protect electoral integrity, even if these measures were sometimes harsh on the political candidates in this election. We believe that this model of open communication with citizens has led to a common understanding within society of these measures to exclude electoral competitors who have violated electoral law and to sanction illegal practices. Furthermore, clearly communicating the penalties and explaining in plain language the legal risks that citizens face by getting involved in networks of electoral interference and manipulation ultimately discouraged these practices and reduced violations of the law. This electoral experience provides an opportunity to learn and implement measures in Romania that can reduce polarization and radicalization and, last but not least, fill the information gap often filled by malicious actors who have a clear goal during the election period and beyond: to erode trust in democratic processes.

Introduction

The parliamentary elections of September 28, 2025, in the Republic of Moldova marked a milestone for democracy in the region – not only through the results themselves but also through what they revealed about the evolution of electoral processes in the digital age. We witnessed what can best be described as two parallel elections: an exceptionally fair physical voting process, conducted in stark contrast to a digital space dominated by voter manipulation, coordinated disinformation campaigns, and systematic attempts to undermine trust in democratic institutions.

The context in which these elections took place is crucial for understanding the challenges faced by Moldova. Just one year after the October 2024 presidential elections – when both the vote and the referendum on European integration were targeted by massive information manipulation and voter corruption operations – Moldovan authorities and civil society entered the new electoral cycle with heightened awareness of vulnerabilities in the information space. This awareness translated into remarkable institutional communication efforts about online dangers and an impressive number of investigations by Moldovan journalists. However, this consciousness did not automatically translate into the capacity to counter hybrid threats, which continued to evolve and diversify.

What makes this electoral cycle particularly significant for the entire region is that Moldova has become a testing ground for advanced information warfare techniques. From networks of Orthodox clerics recruited through pilgrimages to Moscow and trained to spread anti-EU propaganda via Telegram channels, to Vietnamese bot farms amplifying pro-Kremlin narratives, from AI-generated deepfakes to elaborate diaspora electoral fraud schemes – the arsenal of tactics documented in Moldova offers a clear warning for the future of democratic elections in the digital era.

The battle for votes has definitively turned into a struggle for likes, shares, and algorithms. But this transformation is not superficial – it reflects a fundamental mutation in how democracies operate in these times, shadowed by new influencing techniques. When algorithms dictate the information citizens receive, when coordinated networks of fake accounts simulate public consensus, when deepfakes become increasingly indistinguishable from reality, and when digital platforms refuse responsibility for the content they amplify – democracy is deeply affected.

This report documents both sides of these elections: the offline reality at polling stations and the online realm in the digital space, which functions as a spillover effect. This dual approach is not accidental – it stems from an essential observation: observing the voting day itself is no longer enough; even though Moldova’s elections have just concluded, influence networks for future ballots are most likely already being built.

Observation Framework

Funky Citizens conducted an observation mission covering both the physical and digital dimensions of the elections. A total of 89 accredited observers monitored the electoral process in 137 polling stations across Moldova and abroad, documenting all stages – from preparation and opening, to voting, vote counting, and result centralization.

Simultaneously, between September 1–29, 2025, our team analyzed over 42,694 social media posts, identifying 5,575 disinformation narratives (about 13.1%), classified into seven distinct clusters targeting democratic institutions, electoral integrity, and public trust. This activity was implemented through a temporary escalation mechanism coordinated between civil society, the European Commission, and social media platforms (TikTok, Meta, Google, Microsoft, and LinkedIn).

Preliminary Findings

The data presents a paradoxical picture: while Moldovan polling stations operated with remarkable correctness, the digital information space was dominated by:

• Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior (CIB): sophisticated networks of fake accounts amplifying anti-government and pro-Kremlin narratives, with over 160 false profiles created in a single day to create the illusion of popular support
• Cross-platform manipulation: synchronization of disinformation across TikTok, Facebook, Telegram, and other platforms for coordinated dissemination
• Weaponization of religious institutions: Orthodox priests trained and paid in Russia to spread anti-European propaganda via social networks
• Deepfakes and AI-generated content: sophisticated smear campaigns using advanced technologies
• Disinformation infrastructure: over 100 fake news sites blocked by authorities, many reappearing quickly with new domains. 

TikTok remained the primary disinformation vector, representing 90.8% of flagged content despite reporting efforts and cooperation with Moldovan authorities. Networks of coordinated inauthentic behavior continued to operate, with 31.6% of flagged content remaining active until the end of monitoring, highlighting the limitations of current content moderation mechanisms.

Regional Significance

Moldova’s experience is not isolated – it reflects a broader regional trend. Following Romania’s unprecedented annulment of its 2024 presidential elections due to foreign interference through TikTok manipulation, similar patterns in Moldova confirm that these are not random incidents but parts of a larger strategy of democratic destabilization.

The techniques tested in Moldova today can be replicated in other European states tomorrow. Thus, detailed documentation of these methods and of institutional responses is not merely a local concern, but a matter of European security.

This report is divided into two main sections: the first one documents the physical and procedural aspects of voting, showing Moldova’s capacity to organize technically fair elections; the second analyses the digital dimension, revealing the scale and sophistication of information manipulation campaigns. The conclusion synthesizes these two parallel realities and offers recommendations for strengthening democratic resilience against the evolving landscape of hybrid threats.

1. Offline elections – The Electoral Process in Polling Stations

Introduction 

This report provides a detailed analysis of the offline electoral process carried out during the parliamentary elections in the Republic of Moldova, organized on September 28, 2025. The document is based on data collected by independent observers accredited by Funky Citizens, together with the coordination team, and aims to highlight the main issues encountered, to identify good practices, and to offer recommendations for improving future electoral processes. The observation of elections is an essential activity in supporting democratic integrity, having as its purpose the monitoring of compliance with international standards and national regulations.

Within this initiative, Funky Citizens mobilized 89 observers in the Republic of Moldova and in six other countries to monitor all stages of the electoral process – from the preparation of polling stations and the conduct of voting to the counting and centralization of results. They benefited from detailed training – an online live video session (also recorded and made available afterward) and a participatory discussion for debating the most common problems – as well as digital resources – including the Legislative Index, the Observer’s Emergency Kit, regulations, guides, and the Electoral Code – which enabled them to document and report incidents in a transparent and standardized way. The observers played a role in increasing the transparency of the electoral process by identifying and reporting irregularities. In this context, the report presents an overview of how the elections were organized and conducted, focusing on the reported incidents, recurrent problems, and measures taken to remedy them, as well as on the general conduct of the electoral authorities.

Beyond the main objective of the mission – ensuring electoral integrity – this initiative represented a learning opportunity for the Funky Citizens community, offering insight into the challenges and local realities of the Republic of Moldova. It was an experience of applied civic engagement, through which our observers were able to compare and contrast distinct electoral practices with those of Romania, understanding the approaches of various categories of Moldovan institutional actors: from central authorities responsible for organizing elections and the institutions in charge of public order and security to members of polling station commissions, delegates of political parties, Moldovan citizens, and national observers.

Methodology 

The recruitment campaign conducted by Funky Citizens for the accreditation of international observers at the Parliamentary Elections of the Republic of Moldova was carried out through an online form, distributed to former observers accredited by our organization at previous elections, as well as to the general public. Concretely, the form was completed by 120 people between August 22 and September 1, 2025. All applications were subjected to a selection process in order to avoid accrediting politically affiliated persons. Moreover, all observers signed, as part of the accreditation process, a declaration on their own responsibility stating that they were not members of a political party and that they would respect the legal provisions of the Republic of Moldova regarding the status of electoral observers.

Out of the 120 applicants, our organization submitted to the Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Moldova (CEC) a list of 89 persons, of whom 40 chose to observe in polling stations abroad (Romania, Hungary, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom), while 49 observed on the territory of the Republic of Moldova.

For the preparation of observers, we organized an online training session two weeks before the election. This session was recorded and later made available to observers for review or to those who could not participate live. During this session, the relevant legislative framework for election observation was explained, along with the key moments observers needed to pay attention to, as well as logistical details. All relevant resources for election observation were sent by email to the observers and included materials such as the Electoral Code of the Republic of Moldova, the Regulation on Observers (elaborated by the CEC), Voter Guides for domestic and overseas voters (elaborated by the CEC), a Legislative Index, the course materials used during the online training session, and an Observer’s Emergency Kit containing useful scenarios and the relevant legislation for each possible situation encountered in the field.

The 49 observers who carried out their activity in the Republic of Moldova were mobile, usually in teams of two people, monitoring the electoral process in several polling stations. To avoid overlaps, observers were allocated to different areas of the country and to different cities selected by us. The 40 observers abroad were static, as the number of polling stations was smaller and travel conditions did not allow for high mobility.

For each observed polling station, a reporting form was completed, containing a section dedicated to each moment of election day: preparation and opening of the polling station (6:30–7:00 a.m.), the voting process (7:00 a.m.–9:00 p.m., or, if applicable, until 10:59 p.m.), the closing of the polling station, and the counting of votes. We note that not all observers completed the form; however, this did not affect the overall reporting of the observation mission, as information was also transmitted through other communication channels (described below).

Communication with observers was carried out through a main channel (a conversational WhatsApp group). In addition, aspects related to the allocation of observers by city or by common zones where they were located (either in the diaspora or in the Republic of Moldova) were managed in 10 other WhatsApp groups. Email was used for official communication, while phone calls and direct messages were used for direct assistance in more complex or specific cases.

On election day, observers received constant support from the Funky Citizens team to resolve, in real time, any problems identified in or around polling stations.

Number of Polling Stations Observed

The 2025 Parliamentary Elections of the Republic of Moldova were observed by 89 Funky Citizens accredited observers who monitored the electoral process on September 28, 2025. Based on internal reporting forms, the observers covered 137 unique polling stations, both in the Republic of Moldova and in the diaspora. Some polling stations were monitored at several moments during the day – during opening, voting, closing, and counting – by different observers or the same ones in successive shifts, totaling 184 reports centralized by the observers. 

In the Republic of Moldova, the largest concentration of observed polling stations was in the municipality of Chișinău (32 stations), representing the country’s main urban area, followed by Orhei district (17 stations), Anenii Noi (10), UTA Gagauzia (7), Cimișlia (6), and the municipality of Bălți (6). Observers were also present in other districts such as Rezina (5), Ialoveni (4), Soroca (4), Taraclia (3), Căușeni (3), Basarabeasca (2), Fălești (2), Cantemir (2), Strășeni (2), and Criuleni (1). In total, 16 out of the 39 Moldovan districts were covered, representing approximately 41% of the country’s administrative-territorial structure, with 106 polling stations observed on Moldovan territory.

In the diaspora, observers monitored 30 polling stations distributed across several European countries. The largest concentration of observed stations was in Romania, where the Moldovan community is significant, with polling stations monitored in Bucharest, Iași, Galați, Bacău, Brașov, Cluj-Napoca, Suceava, Constanța, and Oradea. In addition to Romania, observers were present in Italy (Rome), Germany (Düsseldorf, Krefeld), Hungary (Budapest), the United Kingdom (Ilford), and Spain (Barcelona).

The achieved geographical coverage demonstrates a balanced presence, with 78% of the observed polling stations located in the Republic of Moldova and 22% abroad. Observers ensured monitoring in all regions of the country–north (Soroca, Rezina, Fălești, Bălți), center (Chișinău, Orhei, Ialoveni, Anenii Noi, Strășeni, Criuleni), south (Cimișlia, Basarabeasca, Taraclia, Cantemir, Căușeni), the Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia, and polling stations organized for citizens from the left bank of the Dniester. 

Main Findings

The parliamentary elections in the Republic of Moldova were conducted, in general, correctly and in accordance with the legislation in force, with Funky Citizens observers noting a high level of procedural compliance and an acceptable level of transparency. However, the electoral process was not free of organizational problems and incidents that require attention. The most frequently identified problems were:

• the photographing of ballots by voters inside voting booths;
• the incorrect positioning of surveillance cameras (recording voter identity or compromising confidentiality);
• the continuation of the electoral campaign in the proximity of polling stations (banners and promotional materials displayed illegally);
• security alerts (bomb threats that led to evacuations).

Among the positive aspects observed, we mention:

• voting booths for persons with disabilities organized in all polling stations;
• the celebration of young voters voting for the first time;
• the clearly established positioning of the polling station members and specially designated places for observers;
• the extremely rapid and efficient vote-counting procedure;
• the helpfulness of the members and presidents of polling stations in relation to observers (access to the mobile ballot box, providing copies of the minutes, etc.);
• inter-institutional communication with law enforcement forces in the countries where polling stations for the diaspora were organized.

Preparation and Opening of Polling Stations

The preparation of polling stations involves verifying, on the morning of election day, the electoral materials necessary for the conduct of the elections. These preparations are carried out by the president of the polling station, in the presence of other members and, when applicable, of accredited persons (such as independent observers or journalists). During the parliamentary elections of September 28, 2025, Funky Citizens observers attended the preparation and opening of approximately 45 polling stations in the Republic of Moldova and abroad.

In most of the observed polling stations, the preparation protocol was followed exactly, without major exceptions that could have compromised the fairness of the electoral process. The sealing of ballot boxes before opening was carried out correctly in over 97% of the observed polling stations, with observers confirming that the boxes were empty, properly sealed, and did not allow the insertion of ballots through any space other than the designated slot.

Opening on time (7:00 a.m.) was respected in 100% of the observed cases. In all observed polling stations, the anthem of the Republic of Moldova was played at the opening. Electoral materials were available and in order in all observed polling stations (100% compliance). The confidentiality of the vote was generally ensured by the proper arrangement of voting booths in most polling stations (96% compliance). However, in a few polling stations significant problems were identified. At polling station no. 68 in Seliște (Orhei), the booths were positioned with the opening angle not visible to observers and the electoral commission, facing in the opposite direction, which reduced transparency and supervision capacity. At polling station 11/38 in Porumbrei (Cimișlia), one of the commission members was positioned in such a way that he could see the vote cast by voters, a situation corrected at the request of observers by moving that member. Initially, in the same polling station, the booths were facing the president’s desk, but they were rearranged in accordance with the instructions established by the CEC after being notified by the observers.

The absence of booths adapted for persons with disabilities was found at polling station 1/258 in Durlești (Chișinău), where the observer reported verbally to the president that there was no booth arranged for people with disabilities and that wheelchair access to that desk was difficult, being blocked between a booth and the video camera. The president replied that she could quickly arrange the booth when someone arrived, but by the time the observer left (8:00 a.m.), the booth had not been arranged. Similarly, at polling station 38/246 in Galați, the booth for persons with disabilities was completely missing. This absence of proper arrangement of the booth was noted in quite a few observed polling stations, even though the necessary logistical materials were available. We note the legal framework for standardized accessibility of polling stations for persons with disabilities, namely the Regulation on the Accessibility of the Electoral Process for Persons with Disabilities, approved by the Decision of the Central Electoral Commission no. 1187/2023. Among the measures provided in this regulation or implemented in practice, we mention the distances between furniture objects to ensure the passage of wheelchairs, ramps for access to the polling place, Braille-printed stencil envelopes (into which the ballot is inserted), a privacy screen to be mounted on a table that allows persons to vote while seated, and magnifying lenses for persons with low visual acuity.

Surveillance cameras presented problems in several polling stations. At polling station 36/18 in Ceadîr-Lunga (UTA Gagauzia), the camera recorded the identity of voters instead of focusing only on the ballot box, a situation reported by the observer and partially adjusted by the president, though not entirely successfully. Such a practice can become an element of intimidation, as it reveals the presence or absence of certain citizens at the polls. In the case of polling station no. 1 in Bucharest (Embassy of the Republic of Moldova), at 8:45 a.m. someone accidentally pulled out the camera’s charger cable, turning it off, and it was unclear how long it remained off before being restarted.

In the diaspora, the preparation and opening process was generally well organized. At polling station 38/231 in Bucharest, the observer noted that the polling station was very small, and the place where observers sat was perpendicular to the commission’s desk and right in front of the ballot boxes, making it difficult to fully observe the process. In addition, three observers from other organizations had the same type of body cameras attached in the morning, but after being warned by the president of the polling station about the prohibition of filming inside the polling station, they removed the cameras, and the incident did not repeat.

In conclusion, the preparation and opening of polling stations were generally conducted according to legal procedures, with a high degree of transparency and professionalism on the part of the members of the electoral offices. The problems identified–mainly related to the arrangement of booths for persons with disabilities, the positioning of surveillance cameras, and a few minor deficiencies in sealing ballot boxes–were largely remedied promptly following observers’ notifications, demonstrating the responsiveness of polling station presidents to independent monitoring.

The Conduct of Voting

From the situations observed in the field, differences can be distinguished between the polling stations in the diaspora (notably those in Romania and Italy) and those within the territory of the Republic of Moldova. While in domestic polling stations the errors observed were mostly procedural, at a detailed level (for example, the incorrect placement of a surveillance camera above the ballot box – polling station 36/18, Ceadîr-Lunga, UTA Gagauzia) and without incidents that blocked the electoral process, in the diaspora there were, throughout the day, either (false) bomb threats (polling station 38/115, Rome, Italy) or provocations such as the dispersal of tear gas in the polling station 38/237 in Iași, Romania – an event without major consequences, as confirmed by the Funky Citizens observer present at that polling station, where the voting process resumed shortly thereafter. Similar situations were encountered in the polling stations for voters from the left bank of the Dniester, where the voting process was suspended in polling station 37/6 in Căușeni due to a (false) bomb alert. We do not have concrete information about the motives behind these alarms or the interest in blocking or temporarily suspending the voting procedure; the Moldovan authorities competent in this regard (in cooperation with foreign authorities in the countries where such incidents were reported) will inform the public in due course. However, we note the disproportion between the areas where these bomb alerts occurred (in the diaspora and in the polling stations for the left bank of the Dniester, as opposed to those within the Republic of Moldova).

Another aspect derived from the considerations above is the positioning of polling stations for voters from the left bank of the Dniester. Considering the presence of Russian armed forces in Transnistria, the electoral authorities in Chișinău did not organize polling stations in that region for this election either, citing security risks and the lack of control that the Chișinău government could have over the proper conduct and integrity of the electoral process in such a militarized area. Thus, following the practice of recent elections and current regulations, Moldovan citizens residing on the left bank of the Dniester voted in a relatively small number of polling places (approximately 362,000 residents expected to vote in 13 stations), 12 located on the right bank, right at the “border” with Transnistria, and one in Chișinău.

Just two days before election day, citing major security risks, the electoral authorities together with law enforcement decided to move another two of the 12 stations to Chișinău, increasing the effort required for voters from the left bank of the Dniester to exercise their right to vote, or, alternatively, increasing congestion at the remaining 10 stations along the border. The insufficient number of polling stations for this segment of the electorate was also noted later in the afternoon of September 28, 2025, when, around 4:00 p.m., the president of polling station 37/6 in Căușeni (the one later suspended due to the false bomb alert) called the CEC headquarters to report the small number of remaining ballots before the end of the day. According to our observer, the instruction received from the commission’s leadership was to direct voters to another locality, Anenii Noi, about 35 km away, where two other similar polling stations were organized. Shortly thereafter, a notice was posted at the entrance of polling station 37/6 redirecting voters to this neighboring locality. We therefore note a discrepancy between the attention with which voters are received in the rest of the polling stations within the Republic of Moldova and the rather difficult conditions created for voters from the left bank of the Dniester.

Among other incidents reported by Funky Citizens observers during the voting process, there were numerous mentions of the ballot boxes filling quickly with cast ballots, an aspect caused by the unusual length of the ballots (a detail that we will return to later), in some cases even the second ballot box provided by the electoral authorities proving insufficient. As a side note, polling station members were constantly using rulers or other objects to disperse the ballots inside through the slot of the box.

Another aspect observed in several polling stations was the lack of visible identification badges worn by persons present in the stations (other than voters), contrary to legal provisions, making it difficult to identify polling station members or stationary observers who were sometimes helping with various logistical aspects (repositioning voting booths, guiding voters inside the station – for example, polling station 36/18 in Ceadîr-Lunga, among others). It was also observed that accredited persons intervened in the electoral procedure, for example, by participating in the counting of votes.

We nevertheless note the firm attitude of the presidents and members of polling stations regarding the illegal practice of photographing ballots by voters. All reported cases witnessed by our observers (polling station 16/56 in Râuleț, Fălești district; 37/3 in Anenii Noi; 25/12 in Orhei; 10/7 in Căușeni; 38/232 and 38/234 in Bucharest; and 38/247 in Oradea) were handled quickly, in the presence of the police, who applied fines, as the act constitutes an offense.

Another type of incident that recurred throughout the day involved attempts by some voters to film inside the polling station (e.g., polling station 38/249 in Suceava, Romania), which were also calmly managed by the presidents of the stations without affecting the voting process and without fines being applied by law enforcement, according to reports from our observers, which could reduce the deterrent effect provided by law.

A singular event occurred in polling station 38/114 in Rome, Italy, where a voter refused to insert the ballot into the box, intending to leave the station with it. The polling station members noticed this and managed to recover the ballot, canceling it and noting the incident in the station’s records. The event caused a short interruption in the voting flow inside the polling station; Italian law enforcement was called, and shortly thereafter, the voting process resumed.

Counting of Votes and Centralization of Results 

The relatively large number of members in the polling stations of the Moldovan electoral system allows for the timely management of counting hundreds or thousands of votes within approximately 2–3 hours after the closing of the polling stations. Although Moldovan electoral law specifies the obligation for the chairperson of the polling station to personally conduct the counting of the ballots, as observed on the ground by Funky Citizens observers, an alternative practice is also applied. This involves, in the first phase, the sorting of the ballots by all members of the polling station, after which the stacks resulting from the ad hoc arrangement by electoral competitors are cross-checked by other members. Specifically, 2–3 groups are formed (for example, polling station 11/38 in Porumbrei, Cimișlia District) that operate independently under the supervision of the polling station chairperson. In the end, the chairperson either verifies each ballot individually or continues with the procedures of recording the numbers agreed upon by these teams in the official report, packing the resulting stacks for each competitor, and signing the report once the calculation formula (“control key”) in this document is confirmed as correct.

Even though the members of the polling station, as well as their leadership (the Chairperson and Secretary), have consistently shown openness to the questions and remarks of observers, the simultaneous procedure of verification (of the validity of ballots taken from the boxes) and counting of hundreds or thousands of votes makes the actual observation of these ballots impossible.

Another practice was noted – in the absence of an explicit regulation to the contrary in the legislation – namely the failure to seal the slot of the ballot box between the moment the polling station is closed and the opening of the box for counting. To ensure the integrity of the ballot box during the handling of stamps and unused ballots, such sealing would be necessary; however, in practice, the ballot box remains within the range of the official surveillance camera, which provides a certain degree of security.

In the case of polling stations with more than 2,000 voters (which is usually the maximum number of citizens assigned to a polling station within the territory of the Republic of Moldova), a situation frequently encountered in the Diaspora polling stations, the counting procedure was hindered by the unusually long length of the ballots (59 cm). Combined with the weight of the paper on which the ballots were printed, both the handling of the ballots during sorting and their validation (that is, the confirmation of the voter’s chosen option) extended the time required for vote counting.

Conclusions and Recommendations 

According to the observations made by the members of the Funky Citizens mission, during the day of September 28 no major incidents or procedural errors were reported that could have altered the final result of the elections. In comparison with the previous election, the Presidential Elections of 2024, which our organization also observed, we note the maintenance of good practices and even an intensification of the actions undertaken by the electoral authorities and law enforcement forces to ensure a climate that respects the legal provisions concerning the competitors registered in the race, as well as those related to the protection of the electoral environment (the dismantling of networks that aimed to corrupt voters or organize violent demonstrations and social unrest before, during, and after election day).

We consider that the proper conduct of the election is due primarily to the Moldovan institutions, which showed proactivity in developing a body of electoral experts (all polling station members are graduates of the courses organized by the Continuous Training Center for Electoral Experts, unlike in Romania, where only the president and deputy have such training; the tablet operator also benefits from specific training provided by the STS), intervened very energetically and promptly with effective measures (e.g. for ensuring security, relocation of polling stations), and established relations with international counterparts to ensure the proper conduct of voting in the diaspora. Nevertheless, we consider that better logistics are needed in equipping polling stations, in the sense of being able to respond to requests for the supplementation of ballot papers, to avoid redirecting voters to another polling station located at a considerable distance. We also noted the high level of compliance by the members of the polling stations and the accredited persons with the legal regulations, with minimal deviations that did not influence the course of the electoral process. We did not encounter problems related to the access of legally accredited observers to polling stations, the members of the polling stations showing openness to the verbal observations made by us and ordering the correction or improvement of the identified aspects.

A positive effect was also produced by the large presence of various international and national observation missions; moreover, we found that in all the polling stations where our observers were present, there were at all times at least two other observers or representatives of the electoral competitors. The presence of observers at the elections of September 28 was essential to confer upon the election the necessary legitimacy, given the geopolitical and financial stakes. Thus, regardless of what happened in the polling stations, the actions were reported and made public, ensuring the transparency of the process. We also mention on this occasion the high level of access granted to observers – national or international – and, in general, to accredited persons at all stages and in all electoral procedures, including the meetings of electoral bodies, in contrast to the situation in Romania, where we continue to encounter problems related to access to polling stations – even if such access is expressly regulated – or to participation in certain procedures – for example, accompanying the mobile ballot box, where access was restricted through what we believe to be an abusive interpretation. Another innovation we appreciated is the introduction of accredited persons into an electronic register (the “Observers” module of the Automated State Information System “Elections”), which can be accessed by the presidents of the polling stations to cross-check the accreditation of observers and to prevent possible falsification of accreditation cards.

What we note, continuing the good practices already observed by our organization during the 2024 election, is that the electoral system of the Republic of Moldova is in a continuous process of development and increasing efficiency, from the elimination of ink pads in voting booths to the extension of the pilot project for electronic electoral lists to 30 polling stations this year. We await the conclusions of this pilot project and hope it can be successfully implemented primarily in the Diaspora, where the absence of electoral lists can cause long waiting times for voters. According to the information transmitted by our observer who was present on September 28 in one of these 30 polling stations (no. 38/297 in Budapest, Hungary), a faster processing of voter data was noted, therefore the benefit that voters appearing at the polls would enjoy through the extension of this project is an evident one.

We note a functional and highly stable legal framework: elections in the Republic of Moldova are organized based on an Electoral Code, the second in their legislative chronology. There also exist numerous regulations and instructions with a high degree of stability, which detail various procedures and ensure a high degree of legislative predictability and professionalism among electoral experts, who can guide their activity according to these normative acts. We specify, however, that the current Electoral Code and the related regulations have undergone successive annual amendments, including in 2024 and 2025, both electoral years. The frequent modification of the electoral legislation, on the one hand, may reflect the concern of the Central Electoral Commission to propose procedural improvements to Parliament, as well as the Moldovan legislative dynamic–some of the provisions having already been declared unconstitutional–but, on the other hand, it creates unpredictability for electoral actors and voters, which can influence the outcome of the elections, a practice that contravenes the recommendations of the Venice Commission. Moreover, the amendments made to the Regulation on the status of observers and the procedure for their accreditation, approved by the Decision of the Central Electoral Commission no. 1195/2023, require organizations that wish to accredit national and international observers to submit information on technical and human capacities, qualifications and experience, as well as sources of funding, without specifying the criteria by which these aspects are to be assessed. We therefore draw attention to the normative changes that may hinder access to the electoral process or give rise to abuses, due to their lack of clarity and predictability, leaving to the discretionary appreciation of the authorities the possibility of restricting certain electoral rights.

We also appreciate the maintenance of requirements regarding the accessibility of polling stations for persons with disabilities, the extension of the number of polling stations where the electronic electoral list system operates, the improved management by the competent authorities of violations of electoral legislation during the electoral period, as well as the transparency of electoral authorities in the decision-making and deliberative process–referring, of course, to the Central Electoral Commission and the public communication carried out by it throughout the electoral period (for example, the creation of a communication channel with international journalists through which information was periodically transmitted regarding the events scheduled for election day, a selection of statements from representatives of public authorities, details from the office or upon request regarding incidents during the electoral period, etc.).

At the same time, we note, also following this observation mission, an aspect previously observed during elections held in Romania over the past two years: election day is marked by an unusual calm – no major incidents are reported. This state of affairs can be interpreted through the diversification of electoral manipulation tactics, which had already been implemented long before election day (organized electoral corruption networks, disinformation spread throughout the period and the electoral campaign, etc.). What we observe is that election day only “harvests the fruits” of a much broader mechanism, developed over a longer period of time. In practice, traditional electoral frauds such as electoral bribery at the door of the polling station, intentional miscounting of ballots from the box, and other irregularities within polling stations are no longer the main concern and have been replaced by other methods. Illegal acts within the electoral landscape have meanwhile moved into the digital environment or take place locally, offline, through networks that are already organized and synchronized by election day. Thus, the actual observation of election day is no longer sufficient; even though the elections in Moldova have just ended, the influence networks for the next elections are, most likely, already being built.

Recommendations

Regarding the recommendations we can make following the observation of 137 unique polling stations, we distinguish the following aspects:

1. The absence of real-time reporting of voter turnout at the polling station level 

Even though the total turnout is available online on the CEC website, the data at the polling station level are not made public by the electoral authority. In practice, this translates into various ad hoc methods of information – either by posting a sheet on a wall where turnout data are written at different time intervals (e.g. polling station 36/18 in Ceadîr-Lunga, Gagauzia), or through constant questioning by observers or other interested citizens of the SIAS “Elections” system operators (from the two laptops), who offer to present these figures. In addition, the representatives of parties present in the polling station keep a parallel count (using mechanical clickers or various printed tables), which in our opinion represents an unnecessary effort of counter-verifying the data from the electronic presence system (SIAS “Elections”). These improvisations could easily be avoided by publishing data at the level of polling station/city/district in real time by the CEC on the platform already available to the public. Likewise, the publication of the minutes would lead to a higher degree of transparency, allowing the comparison of official results with the parallel counting or with the minutes received at the end of the vote count.

2. The format of ballot papers 

The aesthetic custom of having ballot papers in a long format, with the electoral options listed one under another, can function when the number of competitors is not greater than 10–15. However, the chosen format, listing over 59 cm a number of 23 competitors, is impractical, both for voters and from a logistical point of view during the day (no matter how carefully voters fold the ballots when inserting them into the box, they unfold once inserted and quickly fill the boxes, which the members of the polling station must disperse with the help of rulers or other objects that fit through the slot of the box), as well as during the final procedure of opening the boxes and counting the extremely long sheets, which visibly slowed down the confirmation of validity and the establishment of the expressed options. One might wonder how these ballots would have looked if the number of competitors registered in the race had been 40 or 50. We consider that placing the competitors on another format (possibly in two or three columns) would have solved the problems encountered in the election of September 28.  

3.   The arrangement of polling stations for Moldovan citizens from the left bank of the Dniester 

Although we agree with the prudence and motivations presented by the authorities in Chișinău regarding the security and integrity of the electoral process, we consider that both the layout of polling stations and the number of available ballot papers (according to the situation described above in the section on the conduct of voting) should take into account the huge number of voters compared to the number of available polling stations (approximately 27,000 voters per polling station, almost ten times higher than the average for the rest of the territory of the Republic of Moldova). Even if the interest shown by voters from this area is low, and the logistical efforts are adapted accordingly, precisely this aspect should represent a challenge for the electoral authorities (and for political actors as well) to increase the number of those who come to vote–according to the data available on the CEC platform, on September 28 only a little over 12,000 voters out of approximately 360,000 citizens with the right to vote participated. Furthermore, the burden of proof for establishing and sanctioning acts of voter influence is cumbersome–for example, the transportation or organization of voter transportation to the polling station constitutes a contravention only if it is done with the purpose of determining them to exercise their vote. Yet in the case of voters from the left bank of the Dniester, it is almost inevitable that they would organize themselves to travel to the polling stations arranged for them, just as it is difficult for the authorities to prove that undue pressure was exerted upon them.

We consider that the experience of international observation was a favorable opportunity for enriching electoral knowledge, which exposed us to practices and regulations more advanced than those in Romania. At the same time, in light of the security incidents and the attempts to influence the vote in the neighboring country, we are more aware that the current legislation, both in the Republic of Moldova and in Romania, is not adapted to the challenges posed by electoral propaganda conducted online and by forms of voter influence before the holding of elections. Thus, at the level of polling stations in the Republic of Moldova, we generally observed the strict observance of the electoral procedure – which has a higher degree of clarity and efficiency than in Romania – fraud attempts took place before the actual stamping of the ballots, and to our knowledge, there were no interventions upon electoral materials during this election (upon the boxes, successful theft of ballot papers, or their physical falsification).

2. Online Elections - How the Battle for Votes Moved to Likes and Engagement

Introduction

The parliamentary elections in the Republic of Moldova on September 28, 2025, represented an important moment for Moldovan democracy, taking place in a context marked by intensive attempts at external interference and sophisticated disinformation campaigns. Following the presidential elections of October 2024 – when both the vote and the referendum on European integration were targeted by information manipulation operations and voter corruption – the authorities and civil society entered the new electoral cycle with heightened awareness of the vulnerabilities in the information space.

The political context in which the parliamentary elections took place was a polarized one. The Action and Solidarity Party (PAS), led by President Maia Sandu, sought a new mandate based on the country’s pro-European course. At the same time, political formations affiliated with or supported by Moscow – including the Patriotic Electoral Bloc (composed of the Socialists, the Communists, and the Heart of Moldova Party) and the “Great Moldova” party – mobilized supporters through traditional and digital channels, benefiting from the support of the fugitive oligarch Ilan Șor and financial resources originating from the Russian Federation.

Starting in September 2025, Funky Citizens, within the framework of the Bulgarian-Romanian Observatory for Digital Media (BROD), intensively monitored social media platforms, documenting the evolution of disinformation narratives and reporting problematic content. This activity took place through a temporary escalation mechanism involving civil society, the European Commission, and social media platforms (TikTok, Meta, Google, Microsoft, and LinkedIn).

Between September 10 and September 28, 2025, our team analyzed over 42,694 posts on social networks and identified 5,575 disinformation narratives (approximately 13.1%), classified into seven distinct clusters that systematically targeted democratic institutions, the integrity of the electoral process, and public trust in the vote.

The identified narratives included: accusations of massive electoral fraud, personal attacks against pro-European candidates, conspiracy theories about a “parallel state” controlled by the West, threats of war and forced mobilization, economic disinformation amplifying fear of poverty and collapse, as well as coordinated manipulation through networks of false accounts and digital bots. These campaigns were amplified on TikTok (90.8% of the reported content), Facebook, and Telegram, using sophisticated tactics: AI-generated videos, cloned accounts, synchronized messages, and exploitation of algorithmic recommendation systems.

Although the voting process itself took place without major incidents, the information space was severely compromised. The TikTok platform remained the main vector of disinformation, despite reporting efforts and cooperation with the Moldovan authorities. The networks of Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior (CIB) continued to operate, and 31.6% of the reported content remained active until the end of the monitoring period, demonstrating the limitations of current content-reporting mechanisms that affect electoral integrity.

This report documents the scale of manipulation campaigns, assesses the effectiveness of the institutional and platform responses, and formulates recommendations for strengthening the democratic resilience of the Republic of Moldova in the face of hybrid threats that continue to evolve and diversify.

The Funky Mission – Monitoring and Public Information

Funky Citizens published five information bulletins throughout the electoral period. We intensified our reporting by publishing daily updates during the pre-electoral period and on voting days, carrying out real-time monitoring of social networks. In addition, we documented and published two cases of Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior (CIB), which revealed patterns of artificial engagement and coordinated manipulation.

These informational materials led to a high level of public visibility across various platforms. On Facebook, the information bulletins and analyses recorded 55,395 views and reached 33,828 users. On Instagram, they generated 49,945 views, reaching 15,198 unique accounts. At the same time, the analyses and reports published were accessed 408 times on our website.

The purpose of the information bulletins was to inform society in the Republic of Moldova and national and European actors in real time about the evolution of disinformation on online platforms. This need arose from the fact that, in the context of electoral processes in the region, including in Romania, foreign interference and disinformation on platforms were mentioned as major factors, but without clear public information on the concrete way in which these manifested. Funky Citizens assumed the role of protecting the public interest through constant updates regarding the main political and electoral events, as well as through comprehensive analyses of the informational landscape in Moldova. On voting days, we published real-time updates, every few hours, on social media platforms, to draw attention to the main threats to the integrity of the electoral process.

Monitoring and Data Collection Methodology

The Challenge

One of the biggest challenges in monitoring social media platforms in the Republic of Moldova is the collection of raw data, given that empirical grounding is a sine qua non condition for analyzing disinformation narratives. After the disappearance of the CrowdTangle platform and the restriction of access to direct data from large platforms (Meta, TikTok, YouTube), researchers have relied excessively on monitoring lists and manual exploratory analyses. This reduces the efficiency of monitoring and increases the risk of missing emerging phenomena. In an increasingly dynamic digital ecosystem, these limitations can lead to situations such as the aggressive campaigns on TikTok and Telegram during Moldova’s 2025 electoral period, which influenced the perception of the democratic process.

Previous Methods

In previous monitoring cycles, data were collected in bulk from platforms or data providers and then reduced and analyzed through machine learning methods combined with qualitative analysis, resulting in narrative codes and a quantitative analysis of the corpus. During the period when CrowdTangle was functional, it was possible to work with approximately 70–80,000 records daily, allowing for robust coverage of the phenomenon.

After the service was closed, providers such as Gerulata or Meltwater, with their own collection systems, reduced volumes to a few thousand records per day, sometimes even fewer. Moreover, collection was often “on demand,” based on monitoring lists sent by researchers, which generated delays of several days to several weeks. Thus, exploratory analysis had to be done in parallel, with the later addition of newly discovered accounts, which limited the ability to track the phenomenon in real time. This method also raised issues related to the representativeness of the data in relation to the entire discursive universe of social networks.

New Methods

To counter these limitations, our team developed a new methodology for collecting and analyzing online narratives. Starting from the principle that platform algorithms recommend content based on the psychological, social, and cultural profile of the user – a model fundamentally unchanged since the Cambridge Analytica scandal – we built a monitoring system based on simulated profiles.

Thus, accounts were created modeled after social and psychological typologies identified in Moldova (e.g., pro-European youth, vulnerable rural population, traditionalist electorate, diaspora), using dedicated devices. Interaction was limited to following sources of interest, to avoid altering the natural proliferation of content. Public data were collected within the limits of the GDPR (Regulation 2016/679) and the DSA (Regulation 2022/2065). This method allowed us not only to identify viral content but also to extend exploratory analysis to emerging phenomena. After collection, the data were labeled using qualitative methods (Brown & Clarke, 2006), followed by narrative coding and quantitative corpus analysis.

Limitations and Scalability

Although the method has potential for scaling and optimizing the monitoring of disinformation phenomena, there are several limitations:

• Audio-video content analysis remains very costly and time-consuming–either manually or through AI.
• Infrastructure costs for maintaining a DBMS (Database Management System), ETL processes, and analysis teams (human or automated) are constant and high.
• The relevance of data depends on maintaining an updated system of simulated accounts, adapted to the regional and local specifics of Moldova (e.g., Gagauz, Transnistrian, rural, diaspora profiles).

Nevertheless, by scaling the system and integrating localized devices with profiles built on traits specific to the Republic of Moldova, the method can be extended regionally and internationally. This would allow the monitoring of CIB (Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior) networks and their mapping with the help of GIS (Geographical Information Systems) systems, to visualize both the local dimension and the cross-border interconnections of digital manipulation campaigns.

Disinformation and Misinformation on Social Networks

During the period between September 1–29, Funky Citizens analyzed over 42,694 social media posts and identified 5,575 disinformation narratives (approximately 13.1%), which we classified into seven distinct clusters that systematically targeted democratic institutions, the integrity of the electoral process, and public trust in the vote.

(DEMO) Democratic Backsliding & Authoritarianism

This cluster presents PAS and Maia Sandu as transforming the Republic of Moldova into a captured state and a dictatorship, where institutions are usurped, the opposition is silenced, and citizens live in fear. The narratives insist that the ruling party abuses power to remain in control, suppresses rival parties, manipulates elections, and censors critical voices both online and offline.

A dominant theme is the usurpation of state institutions. Maia Sandu and PAS are accused of having captured the Constitutional Court through the appointment of loyal judges, turning it into a political instrument for annulling elections and repressing the opposition–constant parallels being drawn with Plahotniuc’s regime. The Central Electoral Commission is described as violating the law to favor PAS, excluding rivals such as Great Moldova or Democracy at Home, while the Prosecutor’s Office allegedly protects PAS leaders. It is claimed that laws are rewritten or ignored to serve the governing party, thus undermining democracy.

Another recurring angle is that of repression and police abuse. The narratives accuse the authorities of arresting opposition members without reason, dispersing peaceful protests, and issuing arbitrary fines. Posts highlight dramatic examples–searches against activists, confiscation of protest materials, fabricated cases, or even the arrest of mascots at demonstrations–presenting Moldova as a police state where the law serves PAS and not the citizens. It is stated that people are constantly intimidated through ID checks, harassment, and threats of 15–20 years in prison for criticism.

The cluster also emphasizes censorship and information control. The government is accused of ordering the deletion of TikTok accounts, blocking TV stations, removing Telegram and YouTube accounts, and monitoring online discourse through the “Patriot Center.” The narratives claim that PAS fears freedom of expression more than anything else, comparing Moldova to North Korea or other authoritarian regimes. Maia Sandu is portrayed as criminalizing dissent and labeling critics as “foreign agents” or “Kremlin puppets” to justify censorship.

Finally, the narratives combine accusations of corruption, treason, and national decline. PAS is labeled as a mafia or fascist group that enriches itself while destroying Moldova’s sovereignty, morality, and economy. Maia Sandu is accused of treason, selling national assets, and conspiring with Romania, the EU, or George Soros to suppress the people’s will. Protests are presented as the last chance for citizens to “save Moldova” from dictatorship, and opposition leaders are depicted as defenders of national identity and faith against the “Yellow Plague.”

(SOV) Sovereignty & Geopolitical Influence

This cluster portrays Maia Sandu and PAS as “sold out” to the West and betraying the sovereignty of the Republic of Moldova. The narratives insist that the current leaders serve foreign interests–the EU, the USA, Romania, George Soros–and sacrifice the country’s identity, traditional values, and future for money, grants, and political protection. Moldova is described as a “colony” controlled from outside, devoid of real independence, and pushed toward European integration against the will of the majority.

A major theme is betrayal and loss of sovereignty. Maia Sandu is accused of selling the country to the EU and Romania, ceding strategic lands, destroying the economy, and indebting Moldova through European loans. It is claimed that PAS leaders receive millions from the West, accept conditions imposed by Brussels and Washington, and transform Moldova into a “European province” or a “NATO vassal,” losing neutrality and independence. Calls are made for the imprisonment of “traitors” and for the extradition of George Soros, presented as the symbol of the network controlling Moldovan politics.

Another recurring narrative thread is foreign influence and interference in elections. The EU, USA, France, Romania, NATO, and Western intelligence services are accused of directly intervening in internal politics, “buying votes,” and recognizing results only if they are pro-European. Visits by European leaders to Chișinău are presented as “curatorship” and proof of the loss of sovereignty, while the diaspora is portrayed as “manipulated” and “disconnected from reality.”

The cluster also integrates themes of national identity and traditional values. Maia Sandu and PAS are accused of destroying the Orthodox faith, the “Moldovan” language, and the traditional family through the promotion of “LGBT propaganda” and “forced Romanianization.” It is claimed that schools are being turned into indoctrination centers with foreign ideologies, that history is being rewritten, and that Russian symbols are being attacked, while pro-Kremlin leaders or Orthodox clergy are harassed. This rhetoric seeks to link the European vector with the loss of identity and moral degradation.

Finally, the narratives combine poverty, colonization, and geopolitics into an apocalyptic image: the West is said to have brought only crisis, debt, and “slavery,” while Moldova is being used as a market, a NATO platform, or a “dumping ground” for European values and migrants. PAS is portrayed as a “Sorosist regime” that lies with promises of integration, while Russia or “patriotic” leaders are presented as the only chance for salvation, sovereignty, and preservation of traditional values.

(SOCIO) Socio-Economic Decline & Hardship for the Population

This cluster describes the current government as responsible for the economic collapse of the Republic of Moldova and for the poverty in which citizens live. The dominant narratives accuse the government of ignoring people’s needs, being corrupt, destroying agriculture, education, and healthcare, and turning the country into a “state without people,” with massive migration and an aging population. PAS is presented as a “parasite” that robs citizens and keeps the country in a state of permanent crisis.

A central theme is the economic crisis and the collapse of the standard of living. The narratives emphasize the increase in energy prices, low salaries, insufficient pensions, and constant price hikes. It is stated that Moldova has reached the highest level of poverty in Europe, that 65% of households still heat with firewood, and that people are forced to choose between food and utilities. Housing is presented as unaffordable, while schools, hospitals, and factories are closing. The government is accused of having raised the external debt to record levels, spending money on consumption and on the luxury of its ministers instead of on investments.

Another recurring angle is social betrayal and the abandonment of citizens. Pensioners are portrayed as living on the edge of survival, forced to sell possessions to survive, while the government “raises its own salaries to 55,000 lei.” It is insisted that the diaspora votes for PAS, but those remaining in the country bear “the burden of poverty and taxes.” Teachers, doctors, and farmers are presented as abandoned, forced to emigrate or go bankrupt. Social protests are described as proof of the people’s rejection of the “yellow regime.”

The cluster also highlights corruption and resource plundering. The government is accused of fraudulent schemes with gas and energy, money laundering through Energocom, selling land and public assets, and diverting European funds. PAS leaders are portrayed as millionaires with children studying abroad, completely detached from citizens’ realities. The narratives claim that external debt and loans are used only for the enrichment of the political elite, while the people remain “slaves of the banks.”

In the end, an image is built of a Moldova in total collapse, where the government brings only poverty, hunger, and despair. People are presented as emigrating en masse, villages disappear, and children and young people are deprived of a future. European promises are presented as illusions meant to hide reality: corruption, debt, and price increases. The alternative suggested in these narratives is the replacement of the government with “patriotic” opposition capable of lowering tariffs, raising pensions, and giving the country back to ordinary people.

(ELEC) Electoral Fraud & Manipulation

This cluster accuses PAS and Maia Sandu of preparing or committing electoral fraud in order to maintain power, thus undermining the legitimacy of the electoral process. The dominant narratives claim that the government manipulates the Central Electoral Commission, restricts voting access for the diaspora in Russia and Transnistria, falsifies voter lists and ballots, and uses state resources for the campaign. The messages amplify the idea that elections are not free and that results are predetermined with Western support.

A first central theme is the manipulation of electoral institutions. PAS is accused of using the CEC to exclude inconvenient parties, refuse opposition registration, and open polling stations only where it has support. Pre-stamped ballots, “inflated” electoral lists, and votes assigned to deceased persons are presented as evidence of falsification. It is claimed that the government is preparing to annul the election in case of defeat, following the “Romanian model,” and that results are preset to guarantee PAS’s victory.

A second narrative thread concerns the restriction of voting rights. The government is accused of discriminating against the diaspora in Russia and citizens from Transnistria by opening only a minimal number of polling stations (2–12), while hundreds are organized in Europe. The narratives present this practice as a strategy to reduce votes hostile to PAS, turning citizens from Russia and Transnistria into “second-class people.” Protests in Moscow and appeals from the opposition are used to amplify the idea that the government is stealing the people’s vote.

The cluster also emphasizes electoral tricks and bribery. The reduction of energy prices, the distribution of social aid, or promises of subsidies for farmers are presented as “electoral gifts” through which PAS buys votes. Maia Sandu is accused of using European funds for propaganda and financing the campaign with hidden money or corruption proceeds. The opposition repeatedly invokes the “electoral carousel,” vote-buying, and direct threats to voters.

Finally, the cluster integrates accusations of external complicity and geopolitical delegitimization. Maia Sandu is portrayed as “Maia Soros,” “Brussels’s pawn,” supported by Romania, the EU, and the USA to falsify the elections. Visits by European leaders to Chișinău are described as direct interference, and the drop in PAS’s rating is contrasted with the scenario in which the West imposes a pro-European victory through fraud. In parallel, Ilan Șor and other marginalized parties are portrayed as victims of a plot by those in power, while the Kremlin and affiliated media amplify the message that “the elections are stolen and illegal.”

(INFOMAN) False and Manipulative Narratives

This cluster includes fabricated content, deepfakes, and conspiratorial messages meant to fuel fear and distrust in institutions and to promote the pro-Russian opposition as an alternative. The narratives range from absurd accusations about the president’s mental health or personal life to visual manipulations and AI-generated materials falsifying statements, images, and events.

A central theme is the use of deepfakes and AI for defamation. Maia Sandu is presented in manipulated videos as being linked to the “LGBT lobby,” as destroying the church, or as being involved in child trafficking. Other deepfakes show her in ridiculous or intimate situations (alongside Macron, Nicușor Dan, Usatîi), attempting to undermine her public image. PAS ministers are falsely depicted as admitting governmental failures or as being personally responsible for poverty and corruption.

Another category of messages targets personal and medical attacks. Maia Sandu is repeatedly accused of suffering from schizophrenia, of being subjected to electroshock treatments, or of being “crazy” and incapable of leading the country. These narratives are often combined with insults (“monster,” “prostitute,” “stripper”), insinuations about her personal life, or conspiracy theories about secret relationships with foreign leaders. The goal is to dehumanize her and completely delegitimize her.

The cluster also integrates conspiratorial and pseudo-religious messages. Baba Vanga, tarot, horoscopes, or false priests are invoked to claim that Sandu is the “black bird from the West” or the “angel of hell.” Pseudo-scientific narratives promote the existence of two separate languages (“Moldovan” and “Romanian”), while invented prophecies promise the victory of pro-Russian parties as “the will of fate.” This cluster also includes accusations that the EU, NATO, or Soros control Moldova and that “the elections are already decided by the West.”

Finally, the cluster contains media fabrications and hostile propaganda. Photomontages and fake articles attributed to respected institutions (Charlie Hebdo, international NGOs) are used to lend credibility to the messages. Ordinary events (sports losses, accidents, old protests) are reinterpreted as “evidence” of PAS’s failure. Anti-European and anti-Romanian narratives claim that Moldova is a colony, that “Romania is poor,” and that the EU will bring only chaos.

(WAR) War and Security Threats

This cluster accuses PAS and Maia Sandu of sacrificing the neutrality of the Republic of Moldova and pushing the country into a war that does not belong to it. Pro-Russian narratives claim that the government is preparing the mobilization of Moldovans to fight in Ukraine, that it allows NATO and the EU to build military bases on the country’s territory, and that it is turning Moldova into a “second front” of the West against Russia. These messages use an alarmist tone to sow fear and erode trust in the government and in European integration.

A central theme is mobilization and the sending of citizens to war. Maia Sandu is accused of having promised to send “700 mercenaries” to Ukraine after the elections and of planning to recruit thousands of Moldovan youths to fight at the front. False claims circulate about hospitals transformed into centers for Ukrainian soldiers, about convoys of weapons secretly brought to Chișinău, and about plans to close borders with Transnistria. These messages aim to induce panic and to present the government as ready to sacrifice Moldovans’ lives for foreign interests.

A second narrative thread is the militarization of Moldova and the loss of neutrality. NATO and the EU are accused of installing military bases, weapons depots, and training grounds in Moldova, with PAS’s complicity. Alarmist posts claim that tanks, airplanes, and foreign soldiers are already present in Chișinău, Giurgiulești, or border areas. PAS is accused of turning the country into a Western military colony, preparing it for confrontation with Russia and Transnistria.

The cluster also integrates conspiratorial and propagandistic narratives. It is claimed that Maia Sandu receives orders from Soros, Brussels, or Washington to trigger a conflict in Transnistria, that Romania plans to send its army across the Dniester, and that the EU wants to occupy Moldovan territory. Pro-Russia is presented as the only guarantor of peace, asserting that only Moscow can protect Moldova through “stability, tanks, and real power.” In contrast, the West is accused of turning Moldova into a “battlefield” and a “military colony.”

Finally, the cluster constructs the image of a Moldova on the brink of disaster. PAS is accused of “playing its last card” through fear-mongering war propaganda, diverting public money to the army, and preparing Moldova for a fate similar to that of Ukraine. Pro-Russian narratives urge citizens to vote against PAS in order to “preserve peace,” claiming that the opposition’s victory would mean avoiding war, while PAS’s victory would bring mobilization, death, and the loss of neutrality.

(CIB) Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior

This cluster documents coordinated digital manipulation operations carried out by political parties and affiliated networks in the Republic of Moldova, with the goal of artificially amplifying anti-government messages, delegitimizing democratic institutions, and supporting pro-Kremlin agendas. The activities are based on fake accounts, digital bots, and stolen identities, adapted across multiple platforms: Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, and Telegram.

The first investigated case concerned the Modern Democratic Party of Moldova (PDMM), heir to Vladimir Plahotniuc’s network. The analysis of TikTok comments revealed nearly 300 messages generated by 59 fake accounts, many written with the help of artificial intelligence. The comments, often duplicated or “almost identical,” promoted the image of PDMM as a “persecuted democratic voice” and presented PAS as an abusive regime. This astroturfing strategy created the illusion of real civic support for a party excluded from the elections.

A second case investigated by Funky Citizens targeted the Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova, where 160 fake accounts were identified, generating over 200 comments between September 15–20, 2025. The activity peaked on September 19, when 99 accounts were created in a single day. These profiles, with cropped photos to avoid reverse image searches and originating from Russia and Transnistria, flooded the comments section of the Communist Party’s page with attacks against Maia Sandu, exploiting themes such as poverty, fines applied to Gagauz people, and “national betrayal.”

Another example of manipulation is the network of Vietnamese bots connected to the “Moldavian Calendar” accounts on Facebook and Instagram. These accumulated over 60,000 fake followers from Vietnam, Thailand, and Russia, promoting pro-Kremlin narratives and Ilan Șor’s agenda. The content was presented as “independent news,” being distributed through paid ads and inauthentic account networks to give the impression of legitimacy and real audience. We thank our partners at GLOBSEC for reporting this case.

Finally, our analysis documented a synchronized mobilization of the Victory Bloc and Ilan Șor’s allies, presented as a “spontaneous effort” to overthrow PAS. The calls started on VK and OK.ru, circulated on Telegram, and were recycled on TikTok and Meta, using predefined messages, local channels, and a Telegram bot for registration and logistics. This orchestration fabricated the appearance of an authentic popular movement, but in reality, it was a centralized political mobilization operation. We thank our partners at Alliance4Europe, GLOBSEC, and Polisphere for documenting this case.

(GAG) Gagauzia and the Guțul Case

This cluster presents the arrest and conviction of Evghenia Guțul, the Bashkan of Gagauzia, as a political action orchestrated by PAS and Maia Sandu, intended to intimidate the opposition and reduce regional autonomy. The narratives turn Guțul into a symbol of resistance against the regime in Chișinău, portraying her as a victim of corrupt justice and of double standards applied by the pro-European government.

A central theme is political persecution and lack of justice. The Guțul case is described as having predetermined results, false testimonies, and flagrant violations of human rights, including inhumane detention conditions. The seven-year prison sentence is labeled a “political execution,” proof that judicial reform is only a façade under PAS. Posts insist that Sandu personally ordered the conviction within minutes and that the “yellow justice” does not follow the law but revenge.

A second narrative thread is the transformation of Guțul into a symbol of popular resistance. She is presented as a legitimate leader, elected by the people, who suffers reprisals only because she defended Gagauzia and local traditions. Messages compare her to a “political prisoner” and portray her as the voice of those humiliated by the PAS regime. In contrast, Maia Sandu and the government are accused of hating the Gagauz people, of having taken away their autonomy, and of trying to destroy their identity.

Finally, the narratives integrate the geopolitical and international dimension. It is claimed that Europe, the UN, or international lawyers have intervened to defend Guțul, that the Western press condemns the case, and that “the whole world sees the truth about PAS’s dictatorship.” Russia and other pro-Kremlin actors are presented as allies and protectors of Gagauzia, while Sandu and Brussels are accused of wanting to liquidate the region’s autonomy and reduce political opposition.

Below are the themes identified daily, between September 1–29, on the META platforms (Facebook and Instagram), TikTok, and Google (YouTube).

Platform Response to Reporting

During this reporting period, 42,694 posts were analyzed, of which 5,575 were sent to the platforms. On October 2, 2025, the availability of the reported posts was verified, revealing that 55% of them were inactive and 45% were still available.

It is important to note, however, that in some cases where the content appeared inactive, the platforms displayed ambiguous messages that did not specify the definitive removal of the material or the possibility of accessing it from another account or device located in a different region.

Regarding the distribution of reported content by platform, 3,650 posts were reported to TikTok (black – 65%), 1,782 to Meta (blue – 32%), and 143 to YouTube (red – 3%). The content labeled “META” includes posts from both Facebook and Instagram platforms.

The proportion of reported narratives by platform does not reflect the natural distribution of the narratives disseminated through them but rather the degree of transparency of each platform, as well as the type of content processed, which requires technical resources and expertise. Additionally, some of the reported posts included content disseminated from other platforms, which, however, were not part of this monitoring process.

Most of the reports targeted TikTok, where 2,169 posts were deactivated, followed by Meta with 836 and YouTube with 59. Nevertheless, part of the materials containing disinformation or false information remain active and continue to circulate across all these platforms. The chart below illustrates the situation of the reported posts, by platform and their status as of October 2, 2025. The chart below shows the distribution of reported posts by platform and their status as of October 2, 2025.

The chart below illustrates the daily distribution of posts reported to social networks META (blue bars), TikTok (black bars), YouTube (red bars), and the number of posts identified as inactive (green line) as of October 2, 2025. On the vertical axis, the number of posts (0–800) is shown, while on the horizontal axis, the days of the month are represented. TikTok stands out as the platform with the most intense reporting activity, with significant peaks on September 15 (616 posts) and September 19 (607 posts), followed by META, which also shows major increases on the same days (542 and 224 posts, respectively). YouTube appears marginal, with low and sporadic values, between 26 and 68 posts on several specific days (September 8–12), which is explained by the reduced amount of verified and reported content on this platform.

The green line, marking inactive posts, shows notable fluctuations, reaching its peak on September 15 with 802 cases – the highest value of the entire month. Other peaks of inactivity occurred on September 19 (368) and September 26 (310), coinciding with periods of intensified activity on TikTok and META. It is important to note that the date when the availability of these posts was checked does not coincide with the date of their actual reporting.

Contextualized within the electoral period, these developments indicate massive mobilization on social networks around key moments of the presidential campaign. However, it should be mentioned that the differences between posts reported to these platforms are largely due to the availability of collected data and not necessarily to the actual scale of the dissemination of false or manipulative content on these platforms.

Limitations

Due to the lack of transparency of the platforms, as well as the technical resources required for data collection and analysis, there are reservations regarding the full scope of the phenomenon under study. Moreover, in the absence of contextual data concerning the average number of daily posts disseminated on these platforms, as well as the existence of social media “bubbles,” echo chambers, and the non-transparent personalization of recommendation algorithms, we can assume that the reported data and identified trends capture only a fraction of the magnitude of the monitored phenomenon.

Recommendations for Strengthening Electoral Integrity

For Moldovan Authorities and European Institutions:

1. Strengthening the capacity of the Center for Strategic Communication and Countering Disinformation

Although the Center for Strategic Communication and Countering Disinformation was established in 2023, its operational structure remained unclear until 2025, when a presidential decree clarified several aspects regarding its internal organization and the analytical priorities of the information space. We therefore recommend ensuring the necessary human, technical, and financial resources for this newly established institution so that it can monitor informational threats in real time, coordinate institutional responses, and communicate effectively with the public. To achieve this, consultation with civil society, journalists documenting manipulation strategies targeting Moldovan citizens online, as well as with online researchers and analysts, is vital for understanding the challenges that Moldovan society faces in the digital sphere.

2. Investment in media and democratic education

Developing sustainable programs to educate citizens on recognizing disinformation and algorithmic manipulation–targeting various demographic categories through the educational system and involving non-governmental organizations with extensive experience in the field–has become absolutely essential in the face of coordinated disinformation campaigns observed around the parliamentary elections of September 2025.

The Moldovan electoral context revealed the scale and sophistication of information manipulation operations: networks of Orthodox priests recruited through pilgrimages to Moscow to spread anti-EU propaganda via Telegram channels, Vietnamese bot farms amplifying pro-Kremlin narratives, AI-generated campaigns coordinated from Russia through the sanctioned NGO Eurasia, and over 100 fake news sites blocked by authorities. This complex disinformation infrastructure–mobilizing everything from religious communities to fake accounts and AI-generated deepfakes–demonstrates that media education is no longer an option but a national security necessity. Periodic studies by WatchDog.MD and the CBS Research Center reveal the population’s vulnerability to such campaigns: only 41% of citizens believe that things are going in the right direction. This aspect, combined with low levels of trust in state institutions (only 8% have high trust in Parliament, 10% in the Government), creates fertile ground for manipulative narratives that exploit citizens’ economic, identity-based, and security-related anxieties.

Furthermore, since TikTok has become the main battlefield for electoral manipulation and foreign influence campaigns – with visible peaks of coordinated inauthentic behavior–digital education must include components specific to social platforms: recognizing fake accounts, understanding amplification algorithms, and critically evaluating viral content. At this point, it is increasingly difficult to distinguish authentic from coordinated behavior on social networks, given the masked authenticity integrated into accounts spreading voter-influencing messages. 

3. Strengthening international cooperation

Deepening collaboration with regional and European partners to develop unified responses to hybrid threats and to track cross-border disinformation campaigns–including through bilateral mechanisms with Romania and coordination at the EU level–has become imperative, as the Republic of Moldova has turned into a real-time testing ground for advanced information manipulation and foreign interference techniques.

The case of the Republic of Moldova perfectly illustrates the evolution of hybrid threats: from the mere spread of false narratives to integrated ecosystems of manipulation that combine information warfare, offline recruitment, financial infrastructure through sanctioned Russian banks, espionage operations, and even preparation for street violence. This convergence of tactics–digital warfare, religious mobilization, recruitment through educational structures, elaborate electoral fraud schemes within the diaspora, and infrastructure preparation for violent protests–offers a case study for understanding the evolution of threats to European democracies. Moldova’s experience functions as an early warning system for the entire region: the techniques tested here today may be replicated tomorrow in other European states.

4. Increased transparency in electoral decisions

Publishing detailed reports on any detected interferences, the methods used, and the measures taken–to prevent speculation and rebuild institutional credibility–has become necessary for informing citizens about the risks they face both online and offline through manipulation techniques. The case of the Our Right Party serves as a concrete example of the need to document such situations. On October 1, the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) sanctioned the PDA for serious violations of campaign finance legislation after the party became the “surprise” of the September 28 parliamentary elections, obtaining 5.6% of the vote and six parliamentary seats, despite no polls predicting it would pass the 5% threshold. The case of the Democracy at Home Party replicates the model used in Călin Georgescu’s campaign in Romania: the total lack of reporting on digital promotion expenses, despite a massive coordinated campaign on TikTok with thousands of accounts and millions of views. This combination of coordinated artificial amplification and non-transparent financing raises serious questions about the origin of the campaign and the electoral system’s capacity to prevent such operations.

In the context of the recent crisis in Romania – where interference in electoral integrity through online manipulation led the Constitutional Court to annul the entire presidential electoral process in December 2024, after investigations revealed coordinated artificial amplification campaigns on TikTok that favored the pro-Russian candidate Călin Georgescu – it is vital that Moldovan authorities issue comprehensive, well-documented public reports detailing the manipulation techniques used during the parliamentary elections of September 28.

We are living in an era in which digital manipulation has become a matter of national security and must be treated as such. Romania’s response to hybrid threats – although belated and dramatic – demonstrates the cost of delay in documenting and countering foreign interference. Moldova now has the opportunity to be proactive, not reactive, in addressing these threats. In the absence of comprehensive public reports, the information space remains vulnerable to speculation, conspiracy theories, and contradictory narratives that can further erode trust in the democratic process.

For Social Media Platforms:

1. Countering coordinated manipulation

Moving from merely removing content to systematically dismantling bot networks, providing clear explanations for enforcement actions, and publishing regular transparency reports on coordinated inauthentic behavior.

2. Facilitating research access

Ensuring secure access to platform data for qualified groups from civil society and academia, in accordance with the Digital Services Act, for independent monitoring and early threat detection. This would make it possible to improve monitoring efficiency, detect and counter coordinated manipulation, and increase platform accountability by enabling real-time verification of their responses to reported posts. Thus, critical moments signaling the viral spread of problematic posts could be anticipated and managed in time.

3. Independent algorithm audits

Allowing independent evaluations of recommendation systems during electoral periods to determine to what extent they promote harmful or manipulative content.

4. Strengthening advertising control

Identifying and proactively removing deceptive political advertisements, particularly those from foreign sources or using AI-generated materials, ensuring compliance with existing transparency requirements.

5. Faster response to content escalation mechanisms

Improving response times and action rates on reported content, with clear prioritization of threats to electoral integrity.

Conclusion

We observe a phenomenon also noted in elections held in Romania over the past two years: election day was marked by an unusual calm, without major incidents reported. This apparent normality, in fact, reflects a profound diversification of electoral manipulation tactics, which were implemented long before voting day – organized electoral corruption networks, disinformation distributed throughout the campaign, coordinated artificial amplification, and mobilization through pre-synchronized offline structures. Election day merely “reaps the harvest” of a much broader mechanism, carried out over the long term. Traditional electoral fraud – direct bribery at polling stations, miscounting of ballots – has been replaced by sophisticated digital operations and discreetly organized local networks, built up over months. Thus, observing only election day is no longer sufficient to protect electoral integrity; even though Moldova’s elections have just ended, the influence networks for upcoming elections are most likely already being built.

Moldova has become, involuntarily, a testing laboratory for advanced information warfare techniques – from clergy networks trained in Moscow, to Vietnamese bot farms, AI deepfakes, and cross-border electoral fraud schemes. The Moldovan experience offers essential lessons for the entire European region and underlines the urgent need to strengthen institutional capacities, establish sustainable media education, enhance international cooperation, and ensure greater transparency in documenting and countering hybrid threats that continue to evolve and diversify.

The physical dimension of the elections demonstrated optimal organization of the electoral process: efficient distribution of electoral materials, stable operation of electronic verification systems, compliance with security procedures, and absence of major incidents on voting day. This logistical performance shows that the Republic of Moldova has the institutional capacity to organize technically sound elections even under intense external pressure.

However, this procedural success contrasts sharply with the manipulative framework of the digital space. Our findings demonstrate that the battle for electoral integrity has decisively moved to the digital realm, where the rules of the game are fundamentally different. The experience of the Republic of Moldova functions as an early warning system for the entire European region. The techniques tested here – the convergence between digital warfare, religious mobilization, recruitment through educational structures, and preparation for street violence – serve as a warning for the future of democratic electoral processes if decisive measures are not taken to strengthen informational resilience.

This publication was produced with the financial support of the European Union and the German Marshall Fund of the United States – Transatlantic Foundation (GMF TF). Its content is the sole responsibility of Funky Citizens and Transparency International Moldova and does not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union and/or GMF TF.