The Asian Factory of Sovereignism for Bucharest
Published Friday 5 December 2025 at 19:03
Introduction
In the digital era, paid bot farms and astroturfing* are rewriting the rules of democratic play, radically transforming the informational landscape and replacing authentic public opinion with fabricated activity.
*Astroturfing - the artificial creation of an appearance of spontaneous popular support. It is based on massive networks of fake accounts that generate likes, comments, and shares to artificially amplify political messages. These paid bot farms, often operated from distant countries, provide fake followers and engagement, creating the illusion of organic popularity.
In Romania, this tactic raises serious concerns, especially when it comes to influencing public opinion in the electoral context.
The Top News TV Case
The Top News TV Facebook page appeared in Romania's media landscape on October 17, 2025. In just one and a half months, on November 28 (the date of data extraction), it had already recorded considerable activity:
- 620 posts published (approximately 15 a day)
- Over 481.000 likes (about 11.450 daily)
- Approximately 80.000 comments (over 1.900 daily)
- About 64.500 shares (approximately 1.540 daily)
- A community of 107.000 followers (gaining an average of 2.550 followers each day)
Followers from Exotic Countries
The analysis of a sample of 598 page followers, conducted using the Apify platform, revealed a concerning situation: 589 accounts are fake or come from countries with no direct connection to Romania, such as Myanmar, Madagascar, Philippines, Vietnam, India, and other states.
This discovery raises serious questions about the authenticity of the page's audience and suggests the use of paid bot farms to create an artificial appearance of popularity.
The messages from this page supporting Anca Alexandrescu, Călin Georgescu, and George Simion are strategically distributed in groups from Romania.
From an analysis of 726 shares for 4 posts, we discovered that they come from only 13 active accounts across 197 groups. Of the 13 accounts, 8 are fake (created in November 2024), and 5 belong to real people or editorial teams promoting AUR party messages.
The interactive graph below illustrates the dissemination capacity of this network of just 13 accounts. Thus, we can observe that the user "Claudiu Ionut Popa" posts Top News content in 63 distinct groups, the account "Mirela Popa" posts in 52 different groups, the user "Mihaela Popa" posts this content in 38 distinct groups, and the account "Iuilan Iulian" disseminates Top News content in 36 groups.
These are just 4 examples of accounts with prolific activity and strong indicators of automation, being components of a network coordinating inauthentic behaviors, or in other words, part of a "bot" network.
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1UfxHTy6AFexIviqO7_m99LVNzsxu76IH/view?usp=sharing
https://sites.google.com/funky.ong/202511cibnetwork?usp=sharing
Following this research, we identified only 13 of these accounts that contribute to the oversaturation of the online environment with information intoxication, but this is just the tip of the iceberg, the scale of this phenomenon being much more pronounced, and access to data increasingly difficult.
Commercial Links
Although the EU introduced new strict rules on political advertising transparency in October 2025, violations in Romania persist.
According to EU Regulation 2024/900, which entered into force on October 10, 2025, political advertisements must be clearly labeled and include mandatory information about who finances them, amounts paid, and targeting techniques used. The regulation also prohibits the use of sensitive personal data (such as political opinions or ethnic origin) for profiling and blocks paid advertisements from sponsors in third countries three months before elections to prevent foreign interference. In response, Meta decided to completely abandon political advertising on Facebook and Instagram in the EU, citing "significant operational challenges and legal uncertainties," while Google adopted a similar position, considering that the overly broad definition of political advertising in the legislation creates an "unsustainable" level of complexity for platforms and political agents.
În Meta Ads Library sunt vizibile două campanii publicitare: una care promovează site-ul web și un material despre Călin Georgescu, respectiv una care încalcă normele comunității și a promovat-o pe Anca Alexandrescu timp de 9 ore până să fie închisă.
In Meta Ads Library, there are two visible advertising campaigns: one promoting the website and material about Călin Georgescu, and another that violates community standards and promoted Anca Alexandrescu for 9 hours until it was shut down.
On the Google Ads Transparency Center platform, there is also an advertisement promoting the topnewstv.ro website, placed by M&D PROMARKETING S.R.L. In the past, the company ran ads for heating systems.
International Traceability
According to data from ROTLD.RO, the topnewstv.ro domain was registered by CA ADWISE LLC, a company based in Colorado, United States - a detail that adds another layer of opacity to the operation and raises questions about the financing and coordination of this manipulation campaign.
What has this account posted since its creation?
Out of the 620 posts, only 527 contain text. We analyzed these and divided them into the following major themes: Electoral promotion of candidate Anca Alexandrescu (35.5%), Other news (21.6%), Călin Georgescu and the annulment of elections (19.7%), Anti-system narratives (15%), Statements by AUR, POT, SOS, and PSD politicians (9%).
The most widespread category of posts promoted Anca Alexandrescu's candidacy, accounting for 35% of the total. Promotion was done both directly (65% of these thematic posts) or through association with AUR party leader George Simion (35% of these thematic posts). These include materials of diverse character, from footage of public gatherings to electoral materials or posts containing references to conspiracy narratives (e.g., "Anca Alexandrescu reveals the connections between Ilie Bolojan and Soros' network").
Another significant number of posts, accounting for 20% of the total analyzed, promoted Călin Georgescu as Romania's elected president. These messages also contain narratives about the existence of a parallel state that conspires against Romanians and persecutes Călin Georgescu. In some cases, the juxtaposition of Călin Georgescu's narrative image with that of Anca Alexandrescu is used as a rhetorical device to promote the candidate.
Approximately 15% of these posts contain anti-system narratives, primarily directed at the Bolojan government and President Nicușor Dan. Of these, 38% of system-critical posts contain references to policies implemented by the Bolojan government, including fiscal measures and aid to Ukraine. Another 35% of posts contain references to the resignation of USR minister Ionuț Moșteanu and controversies surrounding him. 21% of anti-system posts contain truncated or edited images ridiculing President Nicușor Dan and presenting him as incapable of exercising the office of president. Last but not least, 6% of this type of posts contain references to Vice Prime Minister Oana Gheorghiu.
Additionally, 9% of posts contain statements from politicians in the sovereigntist front, with two exceptions. Thus, statements by AUR deputy Eduard Koler are present in over 42% of this type of posts, followed by POT deputy Gheorghe-Petru Pîclișan (18%), PACE senator Olga Onea (11%), SOS deputy Rodica Plopeanu (9%), Health Minister (PSD) Alexandru Rogobete (9%), POT deputy Ștefan Borțun (7%), AUR leader George Simion (2%), and PSD politician Marius Budăi (2%).
Apart from the main themes presented so far, approximately 22% of all posts included news with a sensational character or strong emotional impact. These include disasters or tragedies and emergency interventions in Romania (e.g., Colectiv), corruption scandals and criticism of post-communist elections in Romania, the economic crisis triggered by Lukoil's withdrawal from Romania, controversies surrounding the death of doctor Flavia Groșan, and other similar events.
In conclusion, the analysis of the 527 texts reveals a strong orientation toward electoral promotion of candidate Anca Alexandrescu, which dominates the investigated media landscape. The consistent presence of messages dedicated to her candidacy, frequently accompanied by associations with AUR leader George Simion, as well as the integration of conspiracy narratives, indicate an intense and well-structured communication strategy for consolidating her public image and mobilizing the electorate.
Furthermore, the positioning of Călin Georgescu as a symbolic figure in the struggle against a supposed "parallel state" represents an essential element in the construction of the analyzed public discourse. The overlap of victimization narratives of Călin Georgescu in antithesis with the ridicule of President Nicușor Dan indicates a strategic instrumentalization of distrust in public institutions and citizens' dismay at social injustice.
Assuming that networks coordinating inauthentic behaviors operate at an infinitely greater capacity than the 13 accounts we identified, the oversaturation of the online environment with information intoxication continues to undermine public institutions and the social polarization of Romanians, seriously affecting confidence in our representative democracy.
Instead of a Conclusion
The Top News TV case clearly illustrates how digital manipulation tools—such as paid bot farms, astroturfing, and opaque international financing networks—can be orchestrated to influence public discourse in Romania. With approximately 98% of analyzed followers coming from fake accounts or countries with no connection to Romania, this operation leaves no room for interpretation: we are witnessing a systematic campaign to artificially amplify political messages.
Bot farms, advertisements that violate community standards, and domain registration through an American company create a complex picture of an operation that goes beyond simple promotion. It is about a deliberate attempt to create the illusion of massive support for certain political figures, thus manipulating citizens' perception before crucial electoral moments.
This case raises fundamental questions about the integrity of Romania's digital space and the urgent need for more efficient mechanisms to combat online manipulation.
