Research
BROD will be bringing to you focused research reports on topics relevant to Bulgaria and Romania. You will be able to find reports in English here, as well as publications in Bulgarian and Romanian.
In addition to its own outputs in research, BROD curates a collection of older studies of the BROD partners and other relevant reports.
In the digital era, paid bot farms and astroturfing* are rewriting the rules of democratic play, radically transforming the informational landscape and replacing authentic public opinion with fabricated activity.
*Astroturfing - the artificial creation of an appearance of spontaneous popular support. It is based on massive networks of fake accounts that generate likes, comments, and shares to artificially amplify political messages. These paid bot farms, often operated from distant countries, provide fake followers and engagement, creating the illusion of organic popularity.
In Romania, this tactic raises serious concerns, especially when it comes to influencing public opinion in the electoral context. [+]
A new report about the disinformation landscape in Bulgaria [+]
On Saturday afternoon, September 13, 2025, a Russian drone violated Romanian airspace during a Russian attack on Ukrainian Danube infrastructure. The incident prompted Romanian authorities to issue RO-Alert warnings for the northern part of Tulcea County, advising the local population of potential falling debris and urging them to seek shelter. Two F-16 fighter jets were immediately scrambled from Fetești Air Base to monitor the aerial situation at the Ukrainian border.
This comprehensive observational snapshot examines the digital information environment surrounding anti-euro protests in Bulgaria during the week September 7-13, 2025, utilizing real-time social media data collection, search analytics, Google platform monitoring, and contemporaneous source supplementation. The study documents mobilization patterns, narrative frameworks, cross-platform coordination, and public engagement metrics during a specific 168-hour observation window preceding and during scheduled demonstrations across multiple Bulgarian cities. [+]
This report investigates the disinformation landscape across X, TikTok, and Facebook during Romania's super 2024–2025 electoral cycle, with particular attention to the role played by Romanian diaspora communities, and a particular focus on those based in Italy. [+]
The third monitoring report on the implementation of the Digital Services Act (DSA) and the Code of Practice on Disinformation (CoPD) in Bulgaria and Romania reveals persistent institutional weaknesses and uneven platform compliance amid rising disinformation threats. Despite Romania’s proactive legislative steps and Bulgaria’s formal designation of a regulator, both countries face significant gaps in enforcement, transparency, and stakeholder coordination. The report underscores the urgent need for empowered national authorities, robust fact-checking networks, and localized strategies to address foreign interference and systemic risks. It advocates for structured multi-stakeholder cooperation and greater platform accountability to safeguard information integrity. [+]
The following report investigates the Bulgarian branch of the Pravda ecosystem — a sprawling network of websites that floods the Internet with pro-Kremlin content targeting over 50 countries, primarily in Europe. The analysis zooms in on Bulgarian Pravda’s web architecture and capacity to influence search engine algorithms and large language models (LLMs) through mass-produced, automated aggregator websites with carefully curated content and extensive search engine optimisation (SEO). Through a combination of OSINT collection, search ranking analysis, infrastructure mapping, and other digital forensic methods, the study corroborates the hypothesis that the Pravda ecosystem targets the algorithms, recommender systems and training data used in some of the most popular online services. In addition, Pravda acts as a web-based repository for the vast volume of pro-Kremlin content published on certain Telegram channels, themselves serving as automаtic aggregators of Russian government actors and Kremlin-controlled media. The findings underscore the urgent need for coordinated countermeasures, algorithmic transparency, and enhanced informаtion resilience across Europe and beyond.
The Centre for Democracy & Resilience at GLOBSEC introduces the 10th edition of its annual public opinion report, GLOBSEC Trends 2025. Based on polling conducted in nine Central and Eastern European countries – Bulgaria, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia – this year’s edition offers a comprehensive picture of how societies in the region view global powers, security threats, democracy, and resilience. [+]
Disinformation isn’t just a problem in Bulgaria and Romania -it’s shaping politics, fueling public distrust, and making democracy feel like a rigged game. Both countries have long struggled with corruption scandals and political instability, but now they’re also dealing with an avalanche of misinformation, much of it pushed by foreign actors like Russia. [+]
The end of 2024 has shown once again how important it is for Romanian citizens to have the skills to distinguish between facts and opinions, to understand the workings of social media, the techniques of persuasion, to be aware of the persuasive role influencers play in public communication, and to be able to do minimal checks on the information that reaches them. For the younger generation, school is the place to teach them all these things. [+]
This report presents the results from research activities implemented by the Center for the Study of Democracy (CSD) as part of the Bulgarian-Romanian Observatory of Digital Media (BROD). It examines the spread of pro-Kremlin disinformation narratives in Bulgarian online media and Telegram channels in 2024, focusing on three key topics of social importance: 1) Bulgarian ethnic minorities in Ukraine, 2) the European Green Deal (EGD), and climate change in general, and 3) the COVID-19 pandemic and vaccination in general. [+]
Four studies conducted by Romanian researchers as part of the BROD project activities used a data-driven perspective to showcase how four sensitive topics (climate change, COVID-19 & vaccination, Romania’s Schengen accession, and the Romanian minority in Ukraine) resonated within Romania’s digital space throughout 2024. [+]
A study done in September 2024 by the SNSPA research team has taken an in-depth look at how major digital platforms—Google, Meta, Microsoft, and TikTok—are implementing the EU’s revised Code of Practice on Disinformation in Romania. [+]
This research explores how individuals engage with news and information, focusing on aspects such as preferred sources of news, formats, and exposure habits within the contemporary media landscape. [+]
Researchers from SNSPA (Romania) and NTCenter (Bulgaria) studied how the Schengen debate in both countries is affected by disinformation and is driving eurosceptic attitudes. [+]
Two pipelines could be employed to facilitate research data analysis activities. (part II) [+]
The technical partener of BROD, ONTO, along with Romanian (SNSPA) and Bulgarian (CSD) parteners developed a pipeline to automatically identify politcally exposed persons (PEP). [+]
The accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the Schengen Area has been a subject of controversy and public debate in the last years, with full access granted as of today, December 12th, 2024. The topic was not spared of many disinformation narratives, circulating in all types of media, in both countries. [+]
The second monitoring report on the implementation of the Code of Practice on Disinformation (CoPD) in Bulgaria and Romania highlights continued platform underperformance and regulatory gaps, despite modest improvements since the first evaluation. Both countries remain vulnerable to foreign information manipulation, particularly from Russian hybrid operations, due to limited institutional capacity, under-resourced content moderation, and lack of tailored EU support. The report calls for stronger national coordination, independent oversight, and improved data transparency to enhance regulatory enforcement and societal resilience. [+]
Romanian society is very supportive of the country’s place in the Western alliance while expressing some doubts about the policies of the EU and NATO. Support for Romania’s membership in these institutions fell during the COVID-years but recovered swiftly after Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. [+]
Not all of Bulgarian society has fully embraced the country’s place in the West yet, but recent GLOBSEC Trends polls indicate that the country is certainly warming up to the EU and NATO. Between 2020 and 2024, Bulgarians’ support for EU membership improved by 7 percentage points, while backing for NATO increased by 15 percentage points. The picture is not perfect, as 73% of Bulgarians agreed with the ‘EU dictate’ narrative in 2024, indicating that concerns about the European Union’s role in Bulgaria remain prevalent. [+]
A recent GLOBSEC poll indicates that the 2024 European Parliamentary (EP) elections could see record participation across the Central and Eastern European (CEE) region. This rise in voter turnout is likely to bolster the legitimacy of the newly elected Parliament. [+]
In Romania, the National Authority for Management and Regulation in Communications (ANCOM) was recently designated as the Digital Services Coordinator, responsible for overseeing and ensuring compliance with the Digital Services Act (DSA). ANCOM has also become part of the European Board for Digital Services, collaborating with other national coordinators, conducting joint investigations, issuing opinions and recommendations, and contributing to developing and implementing guidelines and reports related to the DSA. [+]
The first evaluation of the Code of Practice on Disinformation (CoPD) implementation in Bulgaria and Romania highlights significant gaps in platform accountability, especially in small language markets. Despite new EU regulatory tools like the DSA and DMA, enforcement remains weak due to limited national capacity, insufficient data transparency, and political interference in media oversight. The report calls for stronger coordination, clearer data standards, and independent monitoring to improve compliance and resilience. [+]
The paper offers a perspective on the growing challenge of balancing disinformation
narratives and freedom of expression within European Union (EU) media policy. It
claims that within current approaches such a balance cannot be achieved and that a
serious look at the drivers of media consumption trends and EU media policies on
disinformation is required. Within the current frame of reference there is a need to
carefully consider what we mean by freedom of expression. This paper argues that one
aspect to consider is how current EU media policy, online media consumption and
monetisation models create a space where attention-grabbing and emotionally charged
content is favoured. This viewpoint might shed light on how these trends may potentially
be overshadowing important but less attention-grabbing voices or perspectives. The
article contends that one possible approach would be policies which encourage
prioritising and investing in not-for-profit and participatory media systems built on
community ownership and grassroots input.
Key words: disinformation, freedom of expression, EU, media policy [+]
The European Union is currently facing multiple crises, not restricted to but including the COVID‑19 pandemic, the conflict in Ukraine, ecological and energy-related challenges, immigration pressures, and internal social and political issues. However, Europe and the EU are also defined by their know-how, culture, multilingualism, and contributions to the evolution of Western civilisation, a legacy that should be honoured and progressed to meet contemporary challenges. Our responsibility and hope lie in transforming society sustainably and intelligently in order to respond to anticipated and unanticipated changes. One possible instrument to do so is through European media observatories like the European Media Observatory (EDMO), which can serve as hubs for this purpose. The Bulgarian-Romanian Observatory on Disinformation (BROD) is one of the hubs collaborating with EDMO, which brings together journalists, fact-checkers, public figures, and academic researchers to work towards a society better prepared to tackle disinformation. This paper provides a broad overview of its setup and discusses some of the current challenges in monitoring the progress in counteracting disinformation. [+]
In June of 2022, Google, Meta, Microsoft, TikTok, Twitter (rebranded as X) and a selection of advertising industry companies all signed up to the strengthened Code of Practice on Disinformation (European Commission, 2022). One of the goals of this strengthened version of the code was to empower the industry to adhere to self-regulatory standards in order to combat disinformation. The strengthened code also claims to set a more ambitious set of commitments and measures aimed at combating disinformation online.
Our aim here is to offer an assessment or evaluation of the implementation of the 2022 Code of Practice on Disinformation (CoP) by these companies in Bulgaria. Very little information exists on the implementation of the strengthened Code of Practice when it comes to Bulgaria by Very Large Online Platforms and Very Large Online Search Engines (VLOP and VLOSE) and this is a country which is particularly vulnerable to disinformation narratives. [+]
In recent years Bulgaria has been in constant early elections (five national votes in two years) and governed by a caretaker cabinet for more than a year. Political tensions in the country are a result of several corruption scandals that have led to a deepening lack of trust in the institutions. As a result, powerful societal and political divisions remain impossible to bridge. This mistrust in official institutions and societal divisions are an ideal breeding ground for disinformation. [+]
The research starts from the hypothesis that renarrative in Bulgarian can be
used in journalistic texts to report something that is not necessarily verified and reliable,
according to the requirements of the journalistic profession. News headlines analyzed through
the prism of the use of renarrative show a tendency to move away from this grammatical form
in an attempt to prove that only the truth is being spoken. [+]
This report provides an overview of the key conversation drivers and dynamics from available Facebook data sourced through the Meta Content Library for the period Dec 1-8, 2024. This past week has been pivotal in Romanian politics. Reports from Romanian intelligence services have suggested coordinated efforts to influence the outcome of the first round of the presidential elections. [+]
This article presents a methodological framework for analyzing
disinformation narratives, emphasizing the significance of localized
contextualization, particularly the influence of cultural and historical factors
embedded within these narratives. Understanding these elements is crucial for
unpacking the dynamics and power relations present in disinformation discourses.
The study focuses on misleading information regarding Ukrainian refugees in
Bulgaria, a country vulnerable to disinformation yet often overlooked in research,
partly due to its linguistic context. Additionally, the paper advocates for the
application of Gramscian theories of hegemony and the “war of position” as
contextual lenses to enhance the theoretical and methodological framework. This
framework employs a discourse analysis approach, supplemented by Natural
Language Processing (NLP), enabling the capture of critical aspects of
disinformation dynamics and yielding multi-layered, informative, and actionable
insights. [+]
This analysis focuses on the narratives discovered in over 11,000 available Facebook posts accessed through Meta’s content library surrounding Presidential candidate Călin Georgescu, between December 8-15, 2024. The discourse reveals an increasingly polarized landscape involving both supporters and detractors, shaped by key themes and allegations. [+]
The current assessment examines the organised (dis)information campaign led by pro-Kremlin influence networks against the development of offshore wind energy in Bulgaria. Although the attacks against the development of the sector began already in 2019, when the European Union identified wind energy as the cornerstone of its decarbonisation strategy, it was not before early 2024 that the campaign against offshore wind entered its “hot” phase. The trigger was the attempts of the Bulgarian policy-makers to adapt the country’s legal and regulatory framework to the needs of the sector.
The same pro-Kremlin networks of influence that have been sabotaging Bulgaria's economic and energy security for years have used political, media and civic mechanisms to manipulate public opinion, discredit legislative initiatives and undermine the public support for offshore wind. Key tactics include the dissemination of false claims about the environmental, economic and social risks associated with wind energy, spread by politicians, business associations and media platforms in a highly coordinated manner. [+]
The three country reports reveal a coordinated effort by Russian-aligned actors to exploit the Israel-Hamas conflict and spread disinformation in Bulgaria, Georgia, and Ukraine. Their campaigns leverage existing vulnerabilities in each country's media landscape, such as polarization and low public trust in journalism, amplified across traditional online media and popular social media platforms like Facebook, Telegram, and YouTube.
The primary goal of this disinformation is to deflect attention from Russia's war in Ukraine, sow confusion and discord, deepen societal divisions, and ultimately weaken support for Western institutions and democratic values while promoting Kremlin interests. Common narratives include portraying the West as instigating proxy wars in both Ukraine and the Middle East for geopolitical dominance, baselessly claiming that Ukraine is supplying Western weapons to Hamas through black market deals, and asserting that the "collective West" is abandoning Ukraine by diverting focus and resources to the conflict in Gaza. These narratives frequently involve demonizing Israel and its Western allies.
The disinformation tactics employed often involve coordinated amplification, recycling old or fabricated content, and exploiting the emotional gravity of the conflict to manipulate public perception and erode trust. While the specific local contexts and levels of audience susceptibility vary, the overarching strategy is consistent: to distort the information space and undermine the resilience of these countries against malign foreign influence.
Disinformation is one of the key instruments that undemocratic states use to advance their geopolitical and geostrategic objectives through the manipulation of public opinion, election interference, and undermining the established norms and institutions which guarantee the international rules-based order. Enhancing institutional resilience against threats in the information space is an important prerequisite for strengthening societal preparedness to tackle foreign influence operations.
This practical guidance covers relevant concepts, case studies, and techniques regarding the detection of disinformation messaging, the analysis of risk that its spread poses, and the development of counter-measures to mitigate negative consequences and safeguard the integrity of the information ecosystem. The guidance is grounded in а standardised approach for risk assessment and showcases existing good practice for using strategic communication in response to disinformation threats.
This practical guidance is developed by the Center for the Study of Democracy in cooperation with the Bulgarian Diplomatic Institute. [+]
The report explores the scope, means, and reach of Russia’s information and media capture operations in EU and NATO members Bulgaria and Romania. The comparative study covers web traffic metrics and content analysis of five leading online outlets from each country known for consistently amplifying the foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) activities of the Kremlin and its various proxies. The report contains an analysis of five key recurrent narratives that target democratic institutions, Euro-Atlantic integration, and support for Ukraine’s defense efforts against Russia’s war of aggression. [+]
The EDMO Task Force on 2024 European Parliament Elections publishes today a report on the disinformation narratives during the 2023 elections in Europe. Ahead of next year’s EU Parliamentary elections, useful clues on what will happen during the next electoral campaign can be taken from what happened during this year’s votes. This report is based on over 900 fact-checking articles published in the context of eleven elections in ten different European countries, up to October 2023. [+]
As Russia’s aggression against Ukraine wages on for a second year, Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) finds itself on the right side of history but divided. Most countries remain steadfast in its support for EU and NATO membership, and recognise the inherent threats posed by autocratic regimes to the region’s security. Most CEE societies are taking cue from their political leaders that have sought to openly distance themselves from autocratic regimes and assume a more decisive and vocal role on the international scene. [+]
GLOBSEC provides insight into public attitudes regarding the war in Ukraine in 9 Central and Eastern European EU member states (Bulgaria, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia). While the war serves as disturbing evidence that peace is a fragile thing, it was also a key driver in strengthening solidarity in the region. [+]
Alongside its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia has intensified its hybrid influence operations. Southeast Europe (SEE) in particular remains one of the most vulnerable soft targets for the Kremlin’s ongoing hybrid war. Democratic backsliding, governance deficits, the erosion of civil liberties, and a stalled integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions have kept the region locked in political uncertainty, strategic ambiguity, and susceptibility to foreign malign influence. Media capture and the channelling of illicit financial flows (IFFs) are two of the most critical instruments that the Kremlin employs for state capture in the region. [+]
A case study by Funky Citizens' Elena Calistru and Laura Burtan highlights that the rise of right-wing nationalists affected Romania, too. The authors demonstrate how the narratives of the AUR seek to undermine trust in democracy and transatlantic unity for their own gains. [+]
If liberal democracies want to enhance their resilience against foreign malign authoritarian actors, including their information operations, they need to create a culture of strategic thinking that will prevent fiascos, such as the European energy crisis. GLOBSEC's policy papers seeks to highlight how this enhanced resilience could be achieved. [+]
GLOBSEC highlights the key factors that contributed to the decline in trust in public institutions in the early years of the 2020's, and offers 11 recommendations to counter this worrying trend. [+]
The GLOBSEC Vulnerability Index measures the vulnerability of eight countries (Bulgaria, Czechia, Hungary, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Romania, Serbia and Slovakia) towards foreign influence on a 0-100 scale. [+]
In this publication, the reader is offered an in-depth analysis of GLOBSEC Trends 2023 results from Bulgaria. [+]
Lithuania was one of the first European countries to recognize the dangers of relying too heavily on authoritarian regimes. The policies implemented by Lithuania could help other states improve their resilience to foreign malign influence, too. [+]
